[casi] Iraq: Thinking the Unthinkable - "Three Iraqs, not one "

["as-ilas" <as-ilas@DELETETHISgmx.de>]

"... The time has come to think the unthinkable, about creating a Kurdish
state in the north, an Arab Sunni one in the centre around Baghdad, and an
Arab Shi'ite state in the south around Basra. Repeating mantras about
territorial integrity - the conventional wisdom of international relations -
is productive only as long as it ensures stability and averts chaos. Again,
as Yugoslavia - and the Soviet Union - showed, once strife replaces
stability, territorial integrity loses its strategic meaning and legitimacy.
..."



http://www.kurdmedia.com/reports.asp?id=1706

            Three Iraqs, not one

      23 October 2003
      Daily Times - By Shlomo Avineri
      Saddam's regime was merely the most extreme manifestation of the harsh
underlying fact that Iraq's geography and demography condemned it to rule by
the iron fist. Nor has Saddam's fall changed this fact

      America's mounting difficulties in setting up a coherent form of
government in Iraq, let alone a democratic one, inspire a question that most
statesmen consider unthinkable: is it possible that there is no way to
re-constitute Iraq as one state, and that alternative options must be
considered, unpalatable as they may appear?

      Like so many problems in the re-birth of states wounded by
dictatorship - Eastern Europe is a good example - Iraq's difficulties have
deep historical roots. To blame everything on the heavy-handedness of the
Americans is too simplistic and shallow, even if their mistakes have,
indeed, been legion.

      Iraq was established in the 1920s by the British, who occupied the
region after the Ottoman Empire disintegrated at the end of WWI. Their
policies were dictated by British imperial interests, and gave no
consideration to the wishes, interests, or characteristics of the local
population.

      What British imperial planners did was to stitch together three
disparate provinces of the old Ottoman Empire and put at their head a prince
from Hijaz (now a part of Saudi Arabia). The three provinces - Mosul,
Baghdad, and Basra - each had very distinct characters and very different
population structures.

      Mosul had a Kurdish majority, with significant Assyrian-Christian and
Turkoman minorities; Baghdad was mainly Sunni; and Basra was predominantly
Shi'ite. Throwing such disparate groups into one body politic doomed the
newly invented country to decades of strife and repression.

      The old Ottoman Empire ruled these three provinces - as it ruled all
of its imperial possessions - through its historically autocratic means. The
challenge facing the new Iraqi state was to try to create a non-despotic,
relatively representative form of government in which all sectors of the
population would find an expression of their political will. This turned out
to be an impossible mission. For this reason Iraq - even before Saddam
Hussein - always suffered the most repressive regime of any Arab state.

      In a country where Shi'ites form the majority, the Sunnis -
traditionally the hegemonic group in all Arab countries - were totally
unwilling to allow any democratic process to jeopardize their rule. A Shi'
ite insurrection was brutally put down in the 1920s (with the help of the
British Royal Air Force).

      Similarly, Kurdish attempts at autonomy before WWII were drowned in
bloody massacres of tens of thousands of innocent civilians, and even the
Assyrian Christian minority - a relatively small group, with no political
ambitions - was exposed to murderous assaults in the 1930s.

      Under these conditions, with the Sunni ruling minority constantly
feeling threatened, it was no accident that the only attempt in any Arab
country to establish something like a pro-Nazi fascist regime occurred in
Iraq in the early 1940's under Rashid Ali al-Khailani. The British
suppressed this misadventure, but not before hundreds of Jews in Baghdad
were murdered in a wild farhood (pogrom) instigated by the short-lived
pro-Nazi government.

      Saddam's regime was merely the most extreme manifestation of the harsh
underlying fact that Iraq's geography and demography condemned it to rule by
the iron fist. Nor has Saddam's fall changed this fact: anti-US violence is
not only an expression of anger at foreign occupation; it is also a Sunni
attempt to abort the establishment of a democratic order that would put
them - the historical masters - in a subordinate position.

      Similarly, one cannot see the Kurds in the north submitting willingly
to a Baghdad-dominated Arab regime, let alone a Shi'ite one (most Kurds are
Sunnis). There is little understanding in the West of how deep the Sunni/Shi
'ite divide runs. Put yourself in pre-1648 Europe, a time when Protestants
and Catholics slaughtered each other with abandon, and you'll understand the
enmity immediately.

      So what can be done? Yugoslavia's example shows that in multi-ethnic
and multi-religious countries deeply riven by conflict, partition and
separation may be the only way to ensure stability and democratisation.
There is no doubt today that Croatia and Serbia - despite their
difficulties - stand a better chance of becoming more or less stable
democracies than if they were still fighting for mastery among themselves
within the Procrustean bed of the former Yugoslavia.

      Nor is federation an alternative - as the terms of the federation
itself become the bones of contention (see Bosnia or Cyprus). Even the
pacific Czechs and Slovaks found it easier to develop their respective
democratic structures through a velvet divorce rather than be joined in an
unworkable marriage.

      The time has come to think the unthinkable, about creating a Kurdish
state in the north, an Arab Sunni one in the centre around Baghdad, and an
Arab Shi'ite state in the south around Basra. Repeating mantras about
territorial integrity - the conventional wisdom of international relations -
is productive only as long as it ensures stability and averts chaos. Again,
as Yugoslavia - and the Soviet Union - showed, once strife replaces
stability, territorial integrity loses its strategic meaning and legitimacy.

      This is not a universal prescription for ethnically homogenous states.
The point is simply that there are moments in history when democratisation
and nation building coincide, and that in deeply divided societies the
minimum consensus needed for both to succeed simultaneously is difficult to
achieve. All this may run contrary to conventional wisdom, but who thought
that the USSR would disintegrate? Creative and innovative thinking is needed
about Iraq; otherwise today's mayhem will continue - and worsen. -DT-PS

      Shlomo Avineri is Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem.

      Daily Times (Pakistan)




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