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[ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] Everyone, Concerning the sustainability of the occupation, The Guardian's Brian Whitaker[1] and others [2] caught a RAND Corporation projection[3]: "... if Kosovo levels of troop commitment are used, some 526,000 foreign troops would need to be deployed through 2005. At Bosnian levels, this figure would be 258,000 by 2005; approximately 145,000 international troops would still be required to ensure security at Bosnia levels through 2008." The Atlantic magazine contrasts RAND's estimate with Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections[4] and [5]. The CBO states: "If all existing U.S. ground combat forces in the active and reserve components were used ... the steady-state U.S. occupation force that could be sustained over the long term would comprise 67,000 to 106,000 military personnel. At that level, the occupation would cost $14 billion to $19 billion a year." In other words, 'successful' occupations (though who argues Kosovo qualifies?) require a vastly larger troop presence than afforded by current deployments. However, even current deployment levels may not be sustainable by the U.S. Regards, Drew Hamre Golden Valley, MN USA === [1] See Nicholas Martin's post: http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2003/msg04142.html [2] http://slate.msn.com/id/2086636/ [3] RAND's report is downloadable (PDFs) from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753/; see Chapter 10 for the projections. [4] The CBO PDF is available here: http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=15&issueid=48 The CBO summarizes: "Over the near term—that is, about the next 12 months—the Department of Defense plans to deploy a substantial fraction of its ground forces for occupation duty in Iraq. Over longer periods, however, the need to maintain training and readiness levels, limit family separation and involuntary mobilization, and retain high-quality personnel would most likely constrain the U.S. occupation force to be smaller than it is today (more than 180,000 U.S. military personnel in and around Iraq). ... If all existing U.S. ground combat forces in the active and reserve components were used to support an occupation, with units periodically rotated into and out of Iraq, the steady-state U.S. occupation force that could be sustained over the long term would comprise 67,000 to 106,000 military personnel. At that level, the occupation would cost $14 billion to $19 billion a year. " [5] http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/12/primarysources.htm [DDH - The Atlantic errors in saying the CBO calls for 106,000 'additional' available troops. CBO estimates 67-106,000 troops would be available.] The Atlantic Monthly | December 2003 Primary Sources Mission Impossible? When funds set aside for Iraq's reconstruction proved insufficient, President Bush pressed Congress for $71 billion for security and rebuilding operations. (The President also requested $16 billion for Afghanistan and other "war on terror" activities.) Yet despite mounting calls for more troops on the ground in Iraq, the Administration has remained steadfastly opposed to sending any. This could prove to be a serious mistake. During the war itself, the U.S. prevailed on the strength of technological and tactical superiority. But according to a new study by researchers at the RAND Corporation, who reviewed the seven previous U.S.-led nation-building exercises since World War II, one of the keys to successful nation building is large numbers of ground troops. For instance, consider the contrast between the relative success of such efforts in the Balkans and the slow, unsteady pace of reconstruction in post-conflict Afghanistan; the difference, the researchers found, is largely due to the fact that fifty times more soldiers per capita were deployed to Kosovo after the 1999 war than to Afghanistan after the 2001 conflict. For the United States to achieve a Kosovo-level per capita force presence in Iraq, it would have to deploy about 376,000 additional soldiers there. According to a recent Congressional Budget Office report, however, it's doubtful that the United States will even be able to sustain present force levels (about 150,000 soldiers) past 2004. In the best-case scenario, according to the CBO, only about 106,000 additional U.S. soldiers could be made available over the long term to rebuild Iraq—and a deployment of that size would further strain the already strained National Guard and reserve units. —"America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," RAND Corporation; "An Analysis of the U.S. Military's Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq," Congressional Budget Office _______________________________________ Sent via the CASI-analysis mailing list To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-analysis All postings are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk