[casi-analysis] casi-news digest, Vol 1 #77 - 4 msgs

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Today's Topics:

   1. GAO: United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of
       the Oil for Food Program (Nicholas Gilby)
   2. The Jenin solution in Fallujah? (CharlieChimp1@aol.com)
   3. Sovereignty for Iraq? (k hanly)

--__--__--

Message: 1
Subject: GAO: United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of
    the Oil for Food Program
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2004 09:32:14 +0100
From: "Nicholas Gilby" <Nicholas.Gilby@DELETETHISmori.com>
To: <newsclippings@casi.org.uk>

April 28, 2004


The General Accounting Office (GAO) today released the following
reports, testimony, and correspondence:

TESTIMONY

United Nations: Observations on the Management and Oversight of the Oil
for Food Program. GAO-04-730T, April 28
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-730T
Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d04730thigh.pdf


These and other recent GAO reports and testimonies may be found at
http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/recent.php.




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Message: 2
From: CharlieChimp1@DELETETHISaol.com
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2004 12:56:35 EDT
Subject: The Jenin solution in Fallujah?
To: newsclippings@casi.org.uk, al-awda-canada@yahoogroups.com,
        al-awda-london@yahoogroups.com, efreepalestine@yahoogroups.com,
        Al-Awda-Italia@yahoogroups.com.


[ Presenting plain-text part of multi-format email ]

We'll All Go To Hell With The Marines"

By Stefano Chiarini

** An enormous understanding gap now exists between Iraqis and the occupier=
s.
The Iraqi revolt is a challenge to which the coalition seems unable to
respond effectively. According to a British officer, the American army, ins=
pired by
Israeli methods, may apply "the Jenin solution."

Il Manifesto (Rome)
April 23, 2004

--The version below is translated from Fabio Lo Verso's French version of t=
he
article that appeared on Apr. 26 in Le Courrier (Geneva).

Original article (in Italian):
Original source: Il Manifesto (Rome)
French translation:
Source: Le Courrier (Geneva)

BAGHDAD -- At least 60,000 refugees have fled Fallujah for Baghdad. The
stories they've told about the violence inflicted upon them in their city h=
ave
contributed to the creation of an enormous gap -- beyond anything heretofor=
e seen
-- between the residents of the Iraqi capital and the occupiers. American
soldiers seem bent on doing all they can to alienate the population: "And i=
t's
absolutely mad," exclaimed a British military expert in a bar on the banks =
of the
Tigris. Outside, a hot sandstorm almost takes your breath away. "They'll
never win -- we'll never win." "We, the British, think that we need to lear=
n the
lesson of the Iraqi revolt of the 1920s, back when we exercised a mandate i=
n
this country. In many ways, that rebellion was comparable to the one today.=
 We
also think that what is called for is a method similar to the one we used i=
n
Belfast. But the Americans are adopting the 'Jenin model,' which the Israel=
is
gave them, and which will lead us all into hell with them."

CHAOS ON THE HIGHWAYS

The words of this English officer are confirmed by what happened a few days
ago in front of the Abu Hanifa mosque in Adamiya. On the outer walls of the
building, notices appeared calling for support of the revolt of the inhabit=
ants
of Fallujah against the occupier. By way of reply, marine tanks broke down =
the
gates to the courtyard and destroyed the cases filled with food and medicin=
e
that were in transit to the refugees. Outside, the square in front of the
mosque soon turned into a battlefield.

Last Wednesday, on the same square, life seemed to have resumed its normal
course, when, at 10:30 a.m., a member of the mujahedin wearing a face cover=
ing
shot a man who had just gotten out of an armored vehicle. "That's how
mercenaries working for Israel should end up," he screamed. Then he turned =
toward the
owner of the kiosk where the victim had been heading, and shot him in the l=
eg.
"And woe to those who work for them." The dead man was a South African
national recruited by a private military contractor.

Iraqi fighters are increasing attacks on highways, and inhabitants are hidi=
ng
bombs there in unimaginable places. Every convoy, even those carrying miner=
al
water, has to be escorted.

A considerable quantity of military mat=E9riel remains stuck at the Baghdad
airport, awaiting shipment to Najaf, a city besieged by about two thousand
marines who, beneath a burning sun, have been forced to sleep in military v=
ehicles
and to use a mere six latrines because it has been impossible to get tents =
and
chemical toilets to them.

STATE POWER DESTROYED

As for the defection of Iraqi security agents, Gen. Martin Dempsey, command=
er
of the First Division controlling Baghdad, revealed that half of them had
fired at American soldiers, and had thereby gone over to "the insurgents." =
The
general openly admitted that at bottom there is a political problem, in the
sense that in the absence of a government and defense and interior ministri=
es (all
dissolved by Paul Bremer under the influence of American neoconservatives),
Iraqi soldiers had turned away because of an "unsatisfied expectation," nam=
ely,
that of "a form of hierarchy in which people can have confidence," but also
because of "a tremendous resistance to the idea of using their arms against
their fellow citizens."

The general also expressed his doubts about the U.S.-U.K. decision to
dissolve the Iraqi army and dismiss from their positions in policy-making a=
gencies
all those who belonged to the Baath Party. In doing so, the entire state
structure of Iraq was destroyed. For their part, the members of the "Commit=
tee of
Free Officers," comprised of the upper echelon of those in the Iraqi army
dismissed by Paul Bremer, issued a statement, saying: "In 24 hours, we coul=
d form
anew an army that would put an end to the chaos reigning in this country, b=
ut we
will never do that for the Americans. We will do it only for a governement
that defends the national sovereignty of our country."

THE CIA AND MOSSAD

Public confidence in the occupiers has never been lower. One week ago, a fe=
w
minutes after five bombs exploded in Basra, in the southern part of the
country, causing the deaths of fifty people, British soldiers and doctors a=
rrived on
the scene to provide first aid, and were almost lynched by the mob. They we=
re
accused of being responsible for the attack, which Iraqis attributed, like
all the other scenes of bloody chaos, to the CIA or to the Israeli Mossad. =
This
conviction was expressed in a demonstration last Wednesday "against the
occupation and Blair's crimes."

"Do you know why there weren't any bomb attacks for the last few months?"
asks an Iraqi policeman assigned to guarding a strategic sector of Baghdad.
"Because after the revolt broke out, the agents of the CIA and the Israelis=
 were
primarily worried about saving their own lives. But once the situation calm=
ed
down, first in the south, they got back to work again. Don't talk to me abo=
ut
al-Qaeda!"

But perhaps all is not lost for a fringe element of the military coalition
that claims to be full of good will. A group of experts in mass communicati=
on is
supposed to arrive soon in the Iraqi capital. They're the same ones who
managed Margaret Thatcher's election campaign. Now they're charged with con=
vincing
the Iraqis of the occupation's good intentions. But their success in this c=
ity
is anything but assured.

--Translated [from the Italian] and adapted by Fabio Lo Verso

--
Translated from the French by Mark K. Jensen
Associate Professor of French
Web page: http://www.plu.edu/~jensenmk
E-mail: jensenmk@plu.edu
___________________


--__--__--

Message: 3
From: "k hanly" <khanly@DELETETHISmb.sympatico.ca>
To: "newsclippings" <newsclippings@casi.org.uk>
Subject: Sovereignty for Iraq?
Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2004 21:25:11 -0500

Sovereignty and Iraq after June 30 2004

By James O'Neill

04/29/04 "ICH" -- At his press conference of 14 April 2004 the United States
President George W. Bush reaffirmed his determination that "sovereignty"
would pass to Iraq on June 30 2004. The precise legal basis of this
transition is to be found in a number of documents.

After the American and British led invasion of Iraq, the legal basis of
which is widely regarded as untenable, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 1483 of May 22 2003:

(1) Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq
(2) Stressed the right of the Iraqi people to freely determine their own
political future and control their own natural resources.
(3) Called upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under
international law.
(4) Supported the formation by the people of Iraq, with the help of the
Coalition Authority, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional
administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognised
representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes
the responsibility of the Authority.

The "Authority" referred to in these clauses is the so-called Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), a body whose membership was chosen by the
United States as one of the two occupying powers (the other being the U.K.)
The CPA in turn appointed a Governing Council to carry out administrative
functions, with each administrative unit under the control of a member of
the occupying powers. The Governing Council's membership is heavily drawn
from former Iraqi exiles, the most prominent of whom is the convicted
fraudster Ahmed Chalabi, an especial favourite of the Pentagon.

Until recently the Governing Council has been operating at the pleasure of
Paul Bremer the American "pro-consul" appointed by President Bush. Any
"agreements" reached between the Governing Council and the American
government and/or military have to be interpreted in the same way as
agreements between a ventriloquist and his dummy.

Resolution 1483 was passed in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and
the defeat of the Iraqi armed forces. It contained few specifics as to how
the Iraqi people were to freely determine their own future. That lacuna was
addressed in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 unanimously
passed on October 16 2003. There are four clauses in the resolution of
particular interest.

Clause 1 reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and
underscores in that context the temporary nature of the exercise by the CPA
of its authority and obligations under Resolution 1483. Those powers are to
cease when an internationally recognised representative government is
established by the people of Iraq and sworn in and assumes the
responsibilities of the Authority as set out elsewhere in the resolution.

Clause 4 determines that the Governing Council and its Ministers are the
principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration which embodies the
sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transition period.

Clause 13 authorises a multinational force under unified command to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq. It is this clause that provides the cloak of legitimacy
to the occupying powers. It does not exempt them of course from observance
of their obligations under international law (that Resolution 1483
specifically endorsed). It is almost certainly the case that the bombing of
civilian areas; arbitrary detention of civilians; restrictions on freedom of
movement; and the removal of Mr Hussein from the territory of Iraq to
confinement in Qatar, to cite just some examples, are breaches of the Hague
Regulations 1907 and the Geneva Convention of 1949.

Clause 15 decides that the mandate of the multinational force under clause
13 shall expire upon the completion of the political process that is
elsewhere set out in the Resolution. The relevant political process is the
setting up of a Governing Council in the terms specified in the Resolution.

It is with that background that the members of the Governing Council
laboured to produce a blueprint enabling the completion of the steps to the
resumption of self-government set out in Resolution 1511. It is important to
note that at no stage of all of these events has Iraq ever not been a
sovereign nation. The ability to exercise sovereignty, i.e. independent
self-government with dominion over its own affairs, was of course
compromised by the realities of foreign invasion, conquest and occupation.

It is also important to note however, that the United Nations resolutions
clearly envisage the suspension of real sovereignty to be a temporary phase
that terminates with the swearing in of an internationally recognised
representative government.

After some problems all members of the Governing Council signed the "Law of
Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period" to give it
its formal title, on March 8 2004. Under Article 2 B(1) of the Law the
"transitional period" was defined as commencing on June 30 2004 with the
formation of "a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government" that takes power
on that date.

The primary constitutional task of the Interim Government is to organise the
elections for a National Assembly that are to be held no later than January
31 2005. The general rights and obligations of the government and citizens
of Iraq are set out in some detail. They are for persons accustomed to
Western liberal democracy for the most part unremarkable. It is rather
difficult however to reconcile the guarantees of due process of law in the
Law of Transition document with the actions of the American military in
Falluja and elsewhere in recent weeks.

Two of the Articles in the Transitional Law are of particular importance in
the context of this article. Article 25 provides that the Iraqi Transitional
Government (the one that assumes power on June 30 2004) shall have exclusive
competence in matters of foreign policy, including negotiating, signing and
ratifying international agreements. The most important of those at the
moment is a Status of Forces agreement with the occupying powers.

Further, the Iraqi Transitional Government has exclusive competence in
formulating and executing national security policy and managing the natural
resources of Iraq.

Article 29 provides that upon the assumption of full authority by the Iraq
Transitional Government in accordance with Article 2 B(1), that is, June 30
2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority will be dissolved and the work of
the Governing Council shall come to an end.

For the important transitional period between June 30 2004 and the election
of the National Assembly to be held no later than January 31 2005 the Law of
Administration provides further, in Article 59(B), that the Iraqi armed
forces will be the principal partner in the multinational force established
under Security Council Resolution 1511. This stands in contradistinction to
the recent claims by the Bush administration and military spokesmen that the
American military will remain in control of "security" operations.

Article 59(C) further provides that "consistent with Iraq's status as a
sovereign state, the elected Iraqi Transitional Government shall have the
authority to conclude binding agreements regarding the activities of the
multi-national force established under Resolution 1511.

It is clearly only under Article 59(C) that any foreign military forces may
remain on Iraqi sovereign territory and only then in accordance with an
agreement entered into with the Iraqi Transitional Government.

It is open to the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with both of
the United Nations resolutions cited above and the Law of Administration to
decline to enter into any such agreement. If that happens then all foreign
forces will have to withdraw from Iraqi territory or they will be acting
outside the scope of any lawful authority. Acts such as bombing, shelling or
otherwise destroying Iraqi property, and the killing of Iraqi citizens will
be war crimes, quite apart from any breaches of Iraqi civil and criminal
law.

The U.S U.K and Australian governments clearly do not envisage being asked
to leave. There have been a number of statements from politicians in all
three countries recently marked by phrases such as "staying the course"
"finishing the job" etc. The fact that the "course" or "job" was illegally
commenced is not discussed. Quite how staying to finish a job or otherwise
is lawfully possible without the consent of, or direct request from, the
Iraqi Transitional Government is a question that also remains unasked, much
less answered.

An intimation of the American view can be found in statements made by Mr
Bremer on March 25 2004. He announced that the United States forces would
remain in Iraq regardless of whether or not the new government requested
their departure. This is clearly at odds with the clear terms of Article
59(C) of the Law of Transition.

He also announced that the United States would control the newly formed
Iraqi army. Further, the United States would be housing more than 100,000 US
troops in the 14 major military bases under construction. Again, this cannot
be reconciled with the provisions of Article 59(B).

It is, quite simply, impossible to reconcile the transfer of sovereignty as
set out in the Law of Transition and the Security Council Resolutions with
Mr Bremer's pronouncements. A country cannot at the same time be sovereign,
that is exercising complete self-government and independence, and have
decisions made by an occupation power that explicitly negates the option of
one exercise of that sovereignty, being a request to the occupying forces to
leave.

At the time that Mr Bremer made his pronouncement his probable expectation
was that the CPA would be able to handpick the membership of the Interim
Transitional Government in the same way that it had chosen the membership of
the Governing Council. That body would in turn "negotiate" a Status of
Forces Agreement with the American government, giving effect to Mr Bremer's
declaration. This position was itself a modification of an earlier position.

The earlier intention, contained within section 2 of the Agreement of
November 15 2003 between the CPA and Iraq Governing Council (the
ventriloquist and his dummy) was for a Status of Forces Agreement to be
concluded before March 31 2004. In the light of the developing political
realities however, the IGC refused to sign such an agreement on the grounds
that such an agreement could only be concluded with the sovereign
government. That position was soundly based in international law as only
Status of Forces agreements between sovereign nations are recognised as
being legally binding.

The obvious discontinuities between the provisions of the Transitional Law
signed on March 8 2004 and Mr Bremer's edicts on March 25 2004 are not
difficult to see. The growing Iraqi demand that its people should actually
exercise their sovereign rights as guaranteed in the Security Council
Resolutions and the Transitional Law is coming into conflict with the
different agendas of the occupying powers. In that conflict the "freedoms"
and "democracy" that Mr Bush spoke of in his last press conference appear to
have a distinctly elastic definition.

A probable cause of the increasing armed resistance to the occupation is the
growing realisation by the Sunni and Shi'ite people in particular of the
discontinuity between the written words of the documents referred to above
and daily reality of their lives under occupation.

It is one of the ironies of the present tragedy that the United States,
United Kingdom and Australian governments in launching their illegal attack
upon Iraq did so without regard for the United Nations or international law.
Those same countries now need the United Nations, not only to negotiate the
transition on June 30, but to give some semblance of legality to their
declarations of an intended continued presence in Iraq beyond that date. It
is certainly arguable that without a further Security Council resolution
and/or the request of a properly constituted transitional government any
foreign troop presence in Iraq after June 30 2004 will be without lawful
authority.

The increasing likelihood however, is that the post June 30 period will be
marked by a continuing upsurge in resistance, the further suppression of
which will escalate the committing of war crimes that have been observed in
recent weeks. If the UK, Australia and others remain in Iraq beyond June 30
in clear conflict with the wishes of the Iraqi people and without the
legitimacy of a request from the transitional government, they must bear the
legal consequences of their complicity in American war crimes.

A failure of foreign troops to leave Iraq when requested to do so by the
transitional government will expose as the sham that it is the protestations
of freedom, democracy and a "return" of sovereignty to the Iraqi people.

James O'Neill is a lawyer practising in Brisbane Australia. He can be
reached at joneill@qldbar.asn.au

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6105.htm






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