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[ This message has been sent to you via the CASI-analysis mailing list ] Dear list, There have recently been a couple of good articles on progress towards the January elections (1, 5), as well as a Secretary General's report earlier in the month giving a summary of the limited progress over the summer (16, p. 7-9). Throughout that period, worries about the deadline have been floating around, with the UN quietly panicking (2), and Iraqi politicians needing to publicly deny that there have been problems (3) The most important question is whether the elections will happen at all. Kofi Annan has been becoming gradually more pessimistic in his public statements, most recently telling the BBC that "You cannot have credible elections if the security conditions continue as they are now."(17). I imagine the US wants to avoid any definite postponement before their own elections, so I wouldn't wait for anything so downbeat from them. But the situation on the ground more than justifies Annan's attitude. The UN election assistants have fled to Jordan (5), and the (Iraqi) members of the electoral commission ((4) has a list of their names) rarely dare leave the Green Zone, and feel forced to travel incognito (1) whenever they do venture out. Candidates, too, will have a hard time roaming the country without getting shot. Ironically, they'll need to travel because of the proportional representation system, which was put in place to make it harder for local militias to intimidate candidates. In such a climate, it's natural that most people, like Annan, see security as the main problem. Unfortunately, this has led to an extremely counter-productive approach from the military, which insists that it must invade 'no-go areas' like Najaf and Fallujah in order to provide security for elections. For example an AP from a fortnight ago says that "The U.S. military will work to regain control of rebel strongholds and turn them over to Iraq's fledgling security forces so elections will be seen by Iraqis - and the world - as free and fair." (13) Helena Cobban picks this argument apart in the Christian Science Monitor (12). She argues - based on a comparison to South Africa - that: "For elections to be held and to be judged valid in any part of Iraq, it is not necessary that US forces be in control of that area - only that it be peaceable enough to allow free access by election workers, candidates, and party organizers, all of whom are Iraqi, not American. If the election process has enough general political credibility in the country, they will have the access they need." In fact, escalating the conflict with Sadr is having the opposite effect, opening up the awful possibility of no elections in Fallujah whatsoever: "At the weekend Dr Allawi mooted an alternative possibility, also floated by Lieutenant- General Thomas Metz, operations chief of the 150,000 US-led troops in Iraq: that elections could be prevented or delayed in Fallujah without prejudicing the overall result." (1) Looking at Allawi's comments another way, they're just another step in the long process of scaling back expectations for the elections. In June the UN thought 30,000 polling stations would be needed(6). Now, they're planning to have 7,000 (5). The same scaling-back is happening with voter registration. In June, the UN was planning to use oil for food ration cards to identify voters (9). This was replaced by a plan to have a full census, which would have taken place on October 12 (7). As the 21 July IPO news analysis (10) explains, this is a good thing because the "ration card database is deeply flawed. The Hajj pilgrimage allocations, executed in December and which were based on that database, resulted in gross overestimation of population size of districts that were Ba'athi strongholds, and underestimation of population size from districts that were hostile to Saddam." I'd add to that the practical problem that however good the ration cards were two years ago, they're out of date now, given the large migrations, return of expatriates, etc. A census would also be extremely useful for other reasons (11) However, the census was cancelled in late August because of security concerns(8), and so we're back to the OFF cards (5). What's worse, the procedure for dealing with discrepencies is pretty flimsy: "Residents will be able to look at the list for six weeks in November and December to make corrections...We don't have time to worry too much" (5) Another issue that pops up from time to time is postal voting for non-resident Iraqis. Not surprisingly, the 5-million-strong expatriate community are keen on this, but there are problems. Leaving aside the practical issues of finding them, registering them, and getting them ballot papers, there is the problem that many of those who would class themselves as Iraqi don't have official citizenship. Because 4 fifths of the expatriates are Shia, some Sunni groups may also object to postal voting (15). To understand the significance of this, bear in mind that five million people is somewhere around a sixth of the total population. The obvious next question is what happens if elections are postponed or seriously flawed. I'd love to hear your thoughts on this, but in the meantime I'll leave you with this comment from Juan Cole (18): "Sistani's quite resonable demand for elections is nevertheless among the greatest dangers facing the Allawi government and the Americans. It will be extremely difficult actually to hold the elections on time. But Sistani believes only such elections can produce a legitimate government, and he already accepted a six-month delay. If the elections are not held, and if Sistani begins to fear they won't be held soon, he may well call the masses into the streets. That could lead to an overthrow of Allawi and an expulsion of the Americans. Keep your eye on February and March of 2005." 1. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1261760,00.html 2. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_127.html 3. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_151.html 4. http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/c9d627bb6f3a7aeb85256ea9006561f5?OpenDocument 5. http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43063&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis 6. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-06-16-iraq-vote_x.htm 7. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_133.html 8. http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_139.html 9. http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=41446&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ 10. http://www.casi.org.uk/analysis/2004/msg00380.html 11. http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/6574f59d163e714b85256eaf005795d0?OpenDocument 12. http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0909/p09s01-coop.htm 13. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64018-2004Sep5.html 14. http://www.boston.com/dailynews/252/world/Annan_warns_that_violence_in_I:.shtml 15. http://www.juancole.com/2004_07_01_juancole_archive.html#108956703612409175 16. http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2004/unsc-irq-03sep.pdf 17. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661640.stm 18. http://www.juancole.com/2004_09_01_juancole_archive.html#109530515235243454 ------------ Daniel O'Huiginn do227@cam.ac.uk 07745 192426 24, Priory Road, Cambridge ------------ _______________________________________ Sent via the CASI-analysis mailing list To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-analysis All postings are archived on CASI's website at http://www.casi.org.uk