Powerful Scott Ritter information!

[Rania Masri <rrmasri@DELETETHISunity.ncsu.edu>]

Hello again,

An important note:  in some Internet browsers, the footnotes in Scott
Ritter's article did not appear.  Please do not reproduce the article w/o
the footnotes. The problem is being fixed, and all Internet browsers
should be able to access the footnotes soon.

Thank you,
-Rania      


On Thu, 15 Jun 2000, Rania Masri wrote:

> 
> Dear friends,
> 
> As promised, please find enclosed below an excerpt from Scott Ritter's
> latest -- and most detailed and thus most powerful -- article on Iraq's
> disarmament. The article is called "The Case for Iraq's Qualitative
> Disarmament." It is currently in press, and will be published by "Arms
> Control Today."
> 
> The reference for the article is:  Scott Ritter, "The Case for Iraq's
> Qualitative Disarmament,"  Arms Control Today, Volume 30, Number 5, June
> 2000, pg. __
> 
> The URL for the article is:
> http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm
> 
> Included below are the most powerful excerpts from his article. These
> statements should be used in the discussion with Butler. My apologies for
> the delay in sharing this with you -- please note that Butler will be
> on-line at 5 pm EST!
> 
> I STRONGLY recommend reading this article by Scott Ritter. It is an
> excellent and very powerful resource for us to use in our struggle to end
> the war against the people of Iraq.
> 
> Once again, the article can be viwed
> at: http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm
> 
> - Rania Masri
> 
> -----------
> SCOTT RITTER:
> 
> "Given the comprehensive nature of the monitoring regime put in place by
> UNSCOM, which included a strict export-improt control regime, it was
> possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from a qualitative
> standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed. Iraq no longer possessed any
> meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agent, if it possessed any
> at all, and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been
> eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of
> IRaq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. As long as monitoring
> inspections remained in place, iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no
> one."
> 
> "THrough its extensive investigations, UNSCOM was able to ensure that the
> vast majority of IRaq's WMD arsenal, along wth the means to produce such
> weaponry, was eliminated.  Through monitoring, UNSCOM was able to
> guarantee that Iraq was not reconstituting that capability in any
> meaningful way."
> 
> Ballistic Missiles:
> 
> "In his Dec. 1992 report to the SC, then-Executive Chairmain Rolf Ekeus
> noted, "All ballistic missiles and items related to their production and
> development, identified as requiring destruction ... have been
> destroyed.."
> 
> Chemical Weapons (CW):
> 
> "There was absolutely no evidence that Iraq was trying to hide CW
> production equipment. In its monitoring capacity, UNSCOM carried out
> extensive inspections of all of Iraq's civilian chemical manufacturing
> infastructure and found no evidence of illicit stores of CW precursor
> chemicals. Precursor chemicals are difficult to hide from inspectors
> because the minimum amount required for any viable CW-agent production run
> is several hundred tons. Inspections of dozens of Iraq munitions depots by
> UNSCOM also failed to turn up any illicit unfilled munitions."
> 
> "However, the key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of
> CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a
> specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily
> discernible to weapons inspectors. ... THe point is that all of UNSCOM's
> speculative fears concerning reconstitution of an Iraqi CW capability can
> be laid to rest as long as viable monitoring regime... is in place -- the
> kind of regime that existed prior to the withdrawal of inspectors in
> Dec. 1998." {NOTE: Butler removed the inspectors w/o permission from the
> UNSC.}
> 
> Biological Weapons (BW):
> 
> "...The biologists responsible for monitoring Iraqi compliance found
> exactly that --- compliance.  In all their inspections, the monitors could
> find no meanginful evidence of Iraqi circumvention of its committment not
> to reconstitute the BW program."
> 
> "One of the conclusions drawn from the extensive monitoring of Iraq's
> biological capbilities carried out by UNSCOM was that the overall level of
> Iraq's biolgoical capability, in terms of available infrastructure, was
> very low. ... The reality of the situation was that, regardless of
> UNSCOM's ability to verify Iraq's declarations regarding its past BW
> programs, the major BW production facility at AL Hakim had been destroyed,
> together with its associated equipment, and extensive monitoring of Iraq's
> biological infrastructure could find no evidence of continued proscribed
> activity.  If weapons inspectors were once again allowed back into Iraq to
> resume monitoring along the lines carried out by UNSCOM, there is no
> reason to doubt that similar findings would be had, with the same level of
> confidence."
> 
> Nuclear Weapons
> 
> "Often overloked in the debate about Iraq's nuclear capabilities is just
> how effective the IAEA was at destroying, dismantling, or rendering
> harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability.  Despite every attmpt by Iraq
> to retain some level of nuclear weapons capability, the massive
> infrastructure Baghdad had assembled by 1991 to produce a nuclear bomb had
> been eliminated by 1995."
> 
> "There has been no evidence provided of any attempt by Iraq to acquire a
> nuclear weapon or major related components since 1991."
> 
> Conclusion:
> 
> "No one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last
> inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely
> no reason to believe Iraq could have meaningfuly reconstituted any element
> of its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months."
> [...]
> 
> "By the end of 1998, Iraq had, in fact, been disarmed to a level
> unprecedented in modern history, but UNSCOM and the Security Council were
> unable-and in some instances, unwilling-to acknowledge this
> accomplishment. 
> 
> "Unfortunately, the quantitative standards for Iraqi compliance set forth
> in Resolution 687 are still in place today in the form of Resolution 1284,
> which emphasizes verifying material balance over resuming viable
> monitoring activities. This is a formula for disaster, perpetuating the
> cycle of conflict with Iraq that led to the discrediting of UNSCOM in
> December 1998. UNMOVIC will meet with the same fate unless the Security
> Council takes measures to refocus the inspection regime on disarmament
> issues related to viable weapons and weapons production capability,
> instead of engaging in a never-ending effort to account for every last
> vestige of Iraq's former WMD programs."
> 
> [...]
> 
> "One serious obstacle to the reformulation of Iraq's disarmament
> obligation by the Security Council is the current U.S. policy of removing
> Saddam Hussein from power, codified in the Iraqi Liberation Act of
> 1998. That law has so far failed to threaten Saddam Hussein in any
> meaningful way, but it has succeeded in precluding any meaningful
> diplomatic initiative by locking the United States into a unilateral
> policy that makes cooperation with Iraq impossible. If the United States
> is serious about disarming Iraq, it should repeal the Iraqi Liberation Act
> and work within the framework of the Security Council to formulate a
> policy that results in the rapid reintroduction of meaningful,
> monitoring-based weapons inspections into Iraq. That will require the
> lifting, not simply the suspension, of sanctions. While it is true that
> the sanctions have retarded Iraq's ability to acquire technology that
> could aid any WMD reconstitution effort, Resolution 687 stated that a
> finding of compliance would trigger the lifting of sanctions. Sanctions
> are thus not an open-ended option. At some point, they will need to be
> lifted, and if a finding of qualitative disarmament backed with the
> implementation of viable monitoring-based inspections can be had, then
> there is no reason to keep sanctions in place. The Security Council must
> also follow through on the promise it made in paragraph 14 of Resolution
> 687, which speaks of regional disarmament. While monitoring-based
> inspections in Iraq must be expected to last indefinitely, they cannot be
> expected to last in a vacuum. Unless arrangements are made to address WMD
> programs in Iran and Israel, as well as the regional proliferation of
> advanced conventional weaponry, Iraq will never accept perpetual
> disarmament. What is needed is a Security Council resolution that
> concludes Resolution 687, supercedes Resolution 1284, and redefines the
> disarmament obligations of Iraq to meet more realistic qualitative
> benchmarks. In addition to verifying Iraqi compliance with these new
> benchmarks, the resulting inspectorate, whether a revamped UNMOVIC or a
> new agency, would be tasked with implementing a monitoring regime similar
> to the one UNSCOM had in place prior to its withdrawal from Iraq. Once
> Iraq's disarmament along clearly defined qualitative standards had been
> verified by weapons inspectors, and after a viable monitoring regime was
> in place to detect and deter any attempt at reconstituting its WMD
> programs, the Security Council would lift, not suspend, economic
> sanctions."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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---
        ".. not to believe in the possibility of dramatic change is to
forget that things have changed, not enough, of course, but enough to show
what is possible. We have been surprised before in history. We can be
surprised again. Indeed, we can do the surprising."
        - Howard Zinn, 'You can't be neutral on a moving train.' (p.83)
                                                                        ----

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This is a discussion list run by the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq
For removal from list, email soc-casi-discuss-request@lists.cam.ac.uk
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http://welcome.to/casi