[casi] from today's papers: 30-07-02

["Voices uk" <voices@DELETETHISviwuk.freeserve.co.uk>]

A. US and UK commanders 'scratching their heads' to make sense of invasion,
Guardian, 30 July
B. Five options for ousting Saddam, Guardian, 30 July
C. Blair given 'devastating' warning on attack, Guardian, 30 July
D. New US plan targets heart of Iraqi regime, Guardian, 30 July
E. Listen to the bishops, say union leaders, Guardian, 30 July [letters]
F. No mandate: no war, Guardian, 30 July [leading article]
G. Is it possible that Mr Blair will not back President Bush over Iraq?,
Independent, 30 July [opinion piece by Donald Macintyre]
H. Analysis: The 'inside-out' solution to the problem of Saddam,
Independent, 30 July
I. Jordan's king and Labour MPs warn Blair on Iraq attack, Independent, 30
July
J. King of Jordan appeals to Blair on Iraq, Telegraph, 30 July
K. The world after Saddam, The Times, 30 July [leading article]
L. Raid on Baghdad is key to new US Iraq battle plan, Telegraph, 30 July
M. King warns Blair on Iraq invasion, The Times, 30 July
N. Baghdad strike would aim for jugular, The Times, 30 July
O. Dangers in gamble of going for a city too far, The Times, 30 July

Guardian: letters@guardian.co.uk
Independent: letters@independent.co.uk
Telegraph: dtletters@telegraph.co.uk
Times: letters@the-times.co.uk

[Letter-writers: remember to include your address and tel. # and that the
Times require exclusivity for their letters]

A feast for letter-writers today! A stand-out for a response is the leading
article in the Telegraph (K).

Best wishes,

Gabriel
voices uk

*******************************************************
A. US and UK commanders 'scratching their heads' to make sense of invasion

Richard Norton-Taylor and Julian Borger, Washington
Tuesday July 30, 2002
The Guardian

Military commanders on both sides of the Atlantic are privately expressing
deep unease about American plans to invade Iraq, believing they are ill
thought out with the strategy to achieve the ultimate objective - toppling
Saddam Hussein - far from clear.
It will be a "gargantuan task" which could spark off a conflagration across
the Middle East, a European military official warned yesterday.

A senior British military source said it was clear there was a "desire of
the US government [to attack Iraq] on their own if necessary". He added: "We
are scratching our heads to see what could make strategic sense."

US contingency plans include: heavy air strikes combined with a relatively
small invasion force of 5,000 troops; a force of some 50,000 troops which
could be deployed quickly deep inside Iraq; and a massive ground force of
250,000 US troops supported by 25,000 British soldiers.

All the options are described by a British military source as "high risk".
British military planners - under Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, the chief of
the defence staff known for his cautious approach and retiring next spring -
are reluctantly drawing up their own contingency plans in the event of an
expected request from Washington for support.

Some British military sources suggest the US plans, leaked by the Pentagon,
are merely psychological warfare on Washington's part. Their preferred
option is to continue the existing policy of containment combined with
attempts to destabilise the regime.

In pursuit of the "containment" option, American bombers, supported by RAF
aircraft, on Sunday attacked a communications site in southern Iraq, the US
central command revealed yesterday. It was the sixth such strike this month
in response to what the US said were hostile actions by Iraq.

Growing concern among senior members of the armed forces about the wisdom of
invading Iraq was echoed yesterday by General Sir Michael Rose, a former
head of the SAS and of UN forces in Bosnia.

In an article in London's Evening Standard under the heading: "The madness
of going to war with Iraq", he said: "There are huge political and military
risks associated with launching largescale ground forces into Iraq."

A former chief of defence staff, Field Marshal Lord Bramall, warned in a
letter to the Times that an invasion of Iraq would pour "petrol rather than
water" on the flames and provide al-Qaida with more recruits. He quoted a
predecessor who said during the 1956 Suez crisis: "Of course we can get to
Cairo but what I want to know is what the bloody hell do we do when we get
there?"

Retired top military personnel frequently express the opinions of serving
senior officers. These misgivings about an Iraqi military adventure echo
apprehension among senior uniformed officers on the other side of the
Atlantic, clear splits have emerged between America's professional soldiers
and the gung ho civilian leaders in the White House and the Pentagon.

In briefings calculated to query the administration's persistent sabre
rattling towards Iraq, unnamed officers told the Washington Post that the
policy of containment was working well and that the alternative, a military
assault, was too riddled with risk to be worth pursuing. The officers even
questioned the motivation behind the Bush administration's preoccupation
with ousting Saddam as part of a wider "war on terror". One general
described as being "involved in the Afghanistan war" suggested it could be a
matter of settling scores for the Bush family, after an alleged Iraqi plot
to assassinate the president's father during a 1993 visit to Kuwait. "I'm
not aware of any linkage to al-Qaida or terrorism," the general said, "so I
have to wonder if this has something to do with his father being targeted by
Saddam."

But another uniformed officer at the Pentagon played down the importance of
the dissenting voices. "Has there ever been a single military operation
where you haven't had some voices wondering whether it's a good idea?
Probably not," the officer told the Guardian.

Michael O'Hanlon, a strategic analyst at the Brookings Institution thinktank
in Washington also argued that the reports of uniform-civilian splits had
been exaggerated. "If there are more than one or two on the joint chiefs of
staff who are against it, I'd be surprised," he said. "The thrust is how you
do it and when you do it. They're not questioning the president's decision
on whether to do it."

But he said senior officers were also concerned about "the casual march to
war" being pursued by hawks in the administration, who portrayed the
operation as relatively risk-free.

Richard Perle, a Pentagon adviser and an advocate of an assault on Iraq,
rejected the anxiety voiced as irrelevant. The decision to take on Saddam,
he said, was "a political judgment that these guys aren't competent to
make".

*******************************************
B. Five options for ousting Saddam

Tuesday July 30, 2002
The Guardian

1 The coup
President Bush has ordered the CIA to pursue the "dirty tricks" route to
getting rid of Saddam, of which the most plausible is fomenting a coup
within the dictator's inner circle. But the last significant CIA-inspired
coup attempt, in 1996, was a bloody disaster. The plot was compromised from
the start by Iraqi government infiltrators and untold numbers of plotters
and hapless suspects were executed. Even the CIA director, George Tenet,
reckons a coup has only a 15% chance of success.
2 The Afghan model
Let Iraqi opposition groups do the fighting with heavy US air support and a
few thousand special forces troops on the ground. This was the plan promoted
by General Wayne Downing, Mr Bush's counter-terrorism adviser, but it has
fallen out of favour in Washington due to misgivings over the unity and
military strength of the rebels. Mr Downing himself has since resigned.

3 The Gulf war option
Using up to 250,000 troops supported by devastating air power and technology
that is far more sophisticated and deadly than Gulf war-era equipment. The
attack would be mounted from Kuwait and Qatar, but would also need access to
Iraq's long land borders with Jordan or Saudi Arabia. No one doubts that the
Iraqi army would crumble in the face of the onslaught, but such a large
force would take months to amass and would make an easy target for a
chemical or biological weapon.

4 The surprise attack
This would use between 50,000 and 80,000 troops which could be moved into
the region gradually and surreptitiously, under guise of exercises and troop
rotations. It would advance speedily towards Baghdad, seizing cities in the
south that would become bases for an internal revolt. That revolt would
theoretically trigger a nationwide army mutiny. But it could still give
Saddam time to unleash weapons of mass destruction in a last desperate throw
of the dice.

5 The inside-out attack
Strike at Baghdad and Iraq's other command centres first to "decapitate"
Saddam's forces and minimise the possibility of a biological or chemical
response against US forces or Israel. A high-risk strategy that would expose
US troops to fierce street fighting against Saddam's best troops.

*******************************************************
C. Blair given 'devastating' warning on attack

Michael White, political editor
Tuesday July 30, 2002
The Guardian

King Abdullah of Jordan yesterday warned Tony Blair that US-led military
action to remove Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq "would have devastating
effects" on the Middle East.
As the leader of one of the region's key moderate states expressed his
concern, Labour anxieties that an attack on Iraq may be launched without the
legal protection of a fresh UN mandate also increased despite repeated
official insistence that "no decision has been taken".

During 30 minutes of talks with the prime minister at Downing Street the
king stressed the linkage - which Mr Blair is reluctant to acknowledge in
public - between progress on a solution to the Palestinian crisis and
Anglo-American concerns about weapons of mass destruction allegedly being
amassed by the Baghdad regime. Both sides later said that the talks had
focused primarily on the stalled peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians, "especially the urgent need to put an end to the deteriorating
security situation and to alleviate suffering of the Palestinian people",
Jordanian officials emphasised.

But they also made plain that the king also wants President Bush - whom he
is visiting this week - to listen more to his secretary of state, Colin
Powell, than to US hawks who are "fixated on Iraq" rather than the pressing
need for relief supplies and a diplomatic timetable for a Palestinian state.

Mr Blair is jumpy about reports that he has already signalled willingness to
back a US attack with British forces, despite the widespread doubts in
Europe and the Middle East which, in an interview yesterday, King Abdullah
suggested the prime minister privately shares. Mr Blair also had his first
meeting yesterday with Dr Rowan Williams, the man he last week endorsed as
the new Archbishop of Canterbury, despite his known scepticism about a fresh
war against Saddam. The No 10 spokesman said the talks were "likely to be
fairly introductory and wide-ranging".

Bruce George, Labour chairman of the Commons defence committee, yesterday
admitted that US and UK lawyers would be able to find legal justifications
for a future attack, but said it would be politically wise for Mr Blair to
get a new UN mandate if he is to avoid serious opposition in parliament.

King Abdullah's London statement en route for Washington reiterated Jordon's
desire for "dialogue based on UN security council resolutions (as) the only
way to defuse the situation" in Iraq. Senior Tory MPs claim that the king
privately backs US military action.

*****************************************************
D. New US plan targets heart of Iraqi regime
Swift Baghdad strike aimed at isolating or killing Saddam

Julian Borger, Washington
Tuesday July 30, 2002
The Guardian

The Pentagon was reported yesterday to be considering a daring new war plan
to oust Saddam Hussein, by unleashing a surprise direct assault on Baghdad
and other key command centres with the aim of decapitating the regime in a
few days.
The "inside-out" plan, reversing the tactics used in the Gulf war by
striking at the heart of the regime first, is the latest in a series to be
leaked to the press in recent weeks amid a very public build-up of
administration rhetoric and flexing of Pentagon muscles.

Observers differed over whether the leaks reflected strategic disagreements
in Washington or a deliberate propaganda campaign aimed at intimidating and
confusing Baghdad.

The plan, as described in the New York Times, would fly US troops into
Baghdad on the first day of the campaign, delivering a powerful shock to the
Saddam regime and to the Iraqi people, convincing them in one bold stroke
that the US was determined to topple the dictator.

The inside-out approach would also be aimed at killing Saddam Hussein or at
least isolating him before he could unleash any working biological or
chemical weapons in his arsenal. It would also avoid massing large numbers
of US troops along Iraq's borders where they could be vulnerable to weapons
of mass destruction.

"There is a divergence of views on how can one best diminish the prospect
that he uses weapons of mass destruction, with any efficacy," Joseph Biden,
the chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, said. "That is where
the argument for an inside-out operation gains credibility. There is a
diminished possibility that he will use chemical or biological weapons."

However, the plan could well involve American soldiers fighting their way
through the streets of Baghdad and other cities against Iraq's best and most
determined troops, the special republican guard, instead of pushing towards
the capital in the hope that the regime would implode before US forces
reached the outskirts of the city.

The debate on how to get rid of Saddam has been under way in earnest since
January when the Bush administration decided to pursue a policy of "regime
change" in Iraq. The first plan put forward was a variant of OPLAN 1003,
which US central command had had on its shelves since the Gulf war 11 years
earlier. It involved 250,000 troops and a build-up of three months.

The central command plan was quickly criticised by civilian strategists at
the Pentagon as too lumbering and old-fashioned for a new era of advanced
technology and highly mobile forces. They argued that the job could be done
much faster with as few as 50,000 troops which could be inserted into the
region quietly over a few weeks, allowing the US to launch a surprise attack
from Kuwait, Qatar and other Gulf bases.

The OPLAN 1003 variant was leaked to the press earlier this month,
apparently by radical thinkers at the Pentagon who were frustrated by the
lack of creativity behind it. Some analysts said yesterday that the new
inside-out plan could have been leaked in order to counter suggestions by
apprehensive US officers that an attack on Iraq was too huge and risky an
undertaking compared to the current policy of containment.

John Pike, the head of GlobalSecurity.org, a military and intelligence
thinktank, suggested there was an element of disinformation behind the
leaks, aimed at catching the Baghdad regime off guard.

"One element of the operation if I were planning it would be strategic
deception as to the plan and the timing," Mr Pike said. "If I wanted 50,000
men to march on Baghdad, I would certainly do everything in my power to give
the impression that I was going to wait months while I put together a force
of a quarter million."

Michael O'Hanlon, a defence expert at the Brookings Institution in
Washington, argued there was nothing new in the inside-out approach. He said
any feasible attack plan would involve a surprise assault on the core of
Saddam's power, at the same time as air and ground assaults elsewhere.

He also pointed out that yesterday's New York Times report conceded that the
plan would probably require a force of "something nearer the 250,000 figure"
to ensure that the initial strike force was not stranded inside Iraq.

********************************************************
E. Listen to the bishops, say union leaders

Tuesday July 30, 2002
The Guardian

As your recent coverage illustrates (Bush and Blair agree terms for Iraq
attack, July 27), media speculation over a US war on Iraq is on the
increase. We believe that we are representative of public opinion in Britain
and internationally in rejecting George W Bush's push for military action
against Iraq and urging the British government not to support this.
Claims that Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction are strongly
disputed by most western experts, including former UN weapons inspector,
Scott Ritter, who recently pointed out that no one has presented any facts
to substantiate them. We agree with him that there is no evidence that Iraq
represents a threat to the US or anybody else.

All nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are of concern, including
those of the United States, which George Bush has made clear he wishes to be
able to use on a first-strike basis.

We commend to the British government the advice contained in a recent Church
of England statement circulated to bishops. It points out that such a war
would be outside international law, and urges consideration that "arguments
put forward in favour of action reflect the priorities of American foreign
policy"; and that a war on Iraq could be perceived as a "cruel thirst for
vengeance". The citizens of the Middle East are already outraged at the
plight of the Palestinians. A war on Iraq would bring further instability to
the entire region.
Bill Morris and Andy Gilchrist (FBU), Billy Hayes (CWU), Jeremy Dear (NUJ),
Tony Dubbins (GPMU), Mick Rix (Aslef), Paul Mackney (Natfhe), Judy McKnight
(Napo ), Bob Crow (RMT), General secretary, (TGWU)

Hugo Young criticises Archbishop Runcie and Cardinal Hume for waving the
doctrine of the just war "approvingly through" before the Gulf war in 1991
(A trumpet blast from Lambeth, July 24). The difference quite simply is that
just-war criteria were clearly met in 1991 and they are far from being
clearly met now.
Rt Rev Richard Harries
Bishop of Oxford

**********************************************

F. No mandate: no war
America must not bypass the UN

Leader
Tuesday July 30, 2002
The Guardian

The casualty toll in the second Gulf war is beginning to mount before a shot
is fired. One prominent victim is the United Nations. Secretary-general Kofi
Annan has been given the job of persuading Iraq to allow a resumption of
weapons inspections. To nobody's surprise, he has made no headway so far.
Privately, US and British officials are critical of his efforts, suggesting
he has not been nearly tough enough with the Iraqis. If and when the weapons
talks definitively fail, Mr Annan may be blamed - even though influential
figures such as Vice-president Dick Cheney never really wanted him to
succeed in the first place. US hawks fear that new inspections would let
Saddam Hussein off the hook. For his part, Saddam reportedly believes the US
will try to overthrow him whether or not he readmits the UN.
If the US (and possibly Britain) successfully argues that existing security
council resolutions provide sufficient legal authority for a new attack on
Iraq, the UN's authority will suffer another body blow. There is no doubt
that Saddam is in breach of UN resolutions passed after his 1990 invasion of
Kuwait. But these resolutions do not envisage, or authorise, the sort of
all-out invasion and "regime change" that George Bush now has in mind. To
obtain that kind of mandate, the US must persuade the security council to
invoke chapter VII, article 42, of the UN charter, having first made the
case that Iraq currently presents a "threat to the peace", under article 39,
that cannot be countered in any other way.

This will be very difficult to do. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
capability is assumed rather than known (which is why inspections are
needed). A former UN inspector, Scott Ritter, insists that Iraq's ability to
manufacture such weapons was destroyed in the period to 1998. There is no
evidence that Saddam plans to use such weapons in future, if he has them,
nor that the US is a WMD target and is necessarily acting in self-defence
(article 51), nor that Saddam is threatening his neighbours in a way that
UNSC resolution 949 expressly forbids. Indeed, he has recently been busy
offering olive branches to old enemies in Saudi Arabia, Iran and even
Kuwait.

US intervention on humanitarian grounds, on East Timor and other precedents,
could be justified in theory by UNSC resolution 688 which proscribes
repression of Iraq's civilian population. Such repression undoubtedly
continues. But given the likely cost in civilian lives of a major US attack
and the chaos that would ensue, even Mr Bush might find it a tad bizarre to
be claiming to act on purely humane impulse. For these reasons, the US
(despite anticipated French and Chinese objections) can be expected to try
to bypass the security council, as in Kosovo, while still vaguely claiming
to act in accordance with "international law". It must not be allowed to do
so.

Other early casualties of this so far undeclared war include, principally,
the Palestinians. As Jordan's King Abdullah points out, a new conflict in
the Middle East will set back the cause of Palestinian statehood, not least
because of its impact on US leverage with Arab states and on Muslim opinion
generally. There are those who suspect Mr Bush has already pushed Palestine
to one side in order to concentrate on Iraq. At home, meanwhile, Tony
Blair's credibility on this issue is wounded. The prime minister appears to
be saying one thing to the public and parliament about British military
involvement and something significantly different in private to Mr Bush. Mr
Blair should clarify his position without delay. Casuistry causes
casualties, too.

**********************************************
G. Is it possible that Mr Blair will not back President Bush over Iraq?
Britain has tended to side with the multilateralist, coalition-building
approach of Secretary of State Colin Powell
By Donald Macintyre

Independent
30 July 2002


If there was nothing to talk about at present on Iraq, Tony Blair and King
Abdullah II of Jordan would not have discussed it yesterday. That simple
fact is part of what fuels the entirely reasonable call for the issue to be
debated widely now – a call best expressed by Baroness Williams of Crosby
last week when she complained with incontestable logic that it was always
too early to debate a war until it was too late. Part of the deep anxiety
that she reflects concerns precisely the question of whether Mr Blair's
reluctance to engage in such a debate means that he will support the United
States whatever it eventually decides to do.

For the moment, you have to suppose that behind the rhetoric the Prime
Minister is elaborating his determined expressions of support by at least
drawing attention to a number of concerns that he refuses to share in
public. There have certainly been generalised tensions between Washington
and London in recent weeks. There was deep alarm throughout the British
government over the 11th-hour call for the removal of Yasser Arafat in
President Bush's 24 June speech on the Middle East. So far, the most public
foreign policy fissure between London and Washington in Mr Blair's time
remains, oddly, the one under President Clinton when the British Prime
Minister was urging the ground troops option for Kosovo and a strongly
resistant US administration made its deep irritation public.

But while such a crisis hasn't been reached, it could yet be. King Abdullah
might have been speaking more for the street – in Amman and beyond – than
for a British audience when he said in an interview before meeting Mr Blair
yesterday that Jordan had no more idea of what it would do in the event of
war than Britain and France – adding, remarkably: "All of us are saying:
'Hey, United States, we don't think this is a very good idea.'" But that
doesn't alter the fact that there are common concerns in the governments of
all three countries about the context in which an attack on Saddam might be
launched.

These include, centrally, the question of whether President Bush is prepared
to regard progress towards a Middle East political settlement as a
precondition of an attack on Iraq. Or whether he is prepared to bow to the
converse notion, fostered by the Washington hawks but held in deep
suspicion, to put it mildly, in almost every European capital, that the
removal of Saddam comes first because it will somehow unlock peace in the
region.

They include, too, the question of how much time and diplomatic energy
Washington is first prepared to deploy on the UN demand for Saddam to admit
its inspectors. And they include the issue of whether a fresh UN mandate
would be morally desirable, let alone necessary in international law, as the
impressive new Archbishop of Canterbury, who also met Mr Blair yesterday,
persuasively maintains.

On all these points, it is reasonable to assume, that Britain, like France,
has tended to side with the multilateralist, coalition-building approach of
the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, whom King Abdullah was at pains
this weekend to depict as the man in Washington who "gets it" about the
Middle East. Although British officials stoutly maintain that "bolstering
Colin Powell" is too simplistic a way to describe British policy, the
Secretary of State has certainly invoked London's support more than once in
arguments he has been having in Washington with the unilateralist hawks
clustered in and around the Department of Defence.

Nor is the careful, coalition-building option necessarily a hopeless cause.
It's not simply that some of the senior US military have reportedly been
expressing doubts about too hasty an incursion into Iraq. It's also,
conversely, that the evolving climate in Europe is more complex than it
looks at first sight. The common assumption is that Mr Blair cannot support
war in Iraq without breaking with the rest of the EU. But there are
tentative indications, for example, that President Jacques Chirac, seeking
to repair, in the wake of his election triumph, relations with the US, may
be prepared to offer support, however qualified.

There has even been muttering around the more hawkish elements of the US
administration that Mr Blair sometimes seem less gung ho than – say – the
President's other best European buddy, Jose Maria Aznar (whose perceived
bellicosity is qualified because Spain's military significance to any war in
Iraq is negligible compared to that of the British). More pertinently still,
the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, is actively seeking a deepening
entente with America that could embrace a military attempt to remove Saddam.

None of this means, however that there won't be deeply painful, and for Mr
Blair, politically, as well as militarily, dangerous decisions down the
track. Mr Blair often justifies his stance on Iraq by reference to his 14
September Commons statement last year in which he referred to weapons of
mass destruction. In fact, this referred rather narrowly to the threat that
terrorists would acquire such weapons. That doesn't make military action on
Iraq unjustifiable; but it certainly leaves room for further discussion. No,
the best justification of the refusal to engage in early parliamentary
debate is the fluidity of the decision-making process in Washington, a
process to which every other government remains in the end an engaged
spectator. The overwhelming probability, of course, is that action will
happen. But no one can be sure how the debate on means, timing and context
will be resolved.

The hugely popular Mr Powell is in a very powerful position; his
resignation – a prospect dismissed in London – would be a body blow to the
administration. But how far will he push his multilateralist vision? And
will he prevail? He has swallowed a good deal already – from the first, more
malign, half of the 24 June speech, to the hostile switch of Iran policy
away from aiding the reformers under President Mohammad Khatami, to the
decision to cut off finance for the UN population fund. In a ringing
editorial yesterday The New York Times urged him to stand his ground on a
series of foreign policy issues, including Iraq, but without certainty that
he will do so.

Which brings the issue of British influence, or lack of it, into the
sharpest focus. Supposing the President launches an attack without the fresh
UN cover that a majority of the Security Council want and could probably
provide, without real progress in the Middle East, and with no coalition to
speak of? Hope it will not happen.

But if it does, that's the point at which Mr Blair could not offer his
country's support for the US without creating, at incalculable cost,
fissures not only within his own Cabinet but with Europe. British influence
on the most important foreign policy issue for a generation would be seen to
have failed. The UN, in the age in which it is most urgently needed, would
have been abandoned. And it would be up to the British Prime Minister to
recognise that without influence there is no point left in being a poodle.

*************************************************************
H. Analysis: The 'inside-out' solution to the problem of Saddam
As arguments rage in the US over how to depose the Iraqi president, a new
strategy to trigger his overthrow is under consideration
By Rupert Cornwell in Washington

Independent
30 July 2002

Maybe, just maybe, this week will provide a few answers to some of the
myriad questions about US policy towards Iraq.

The basic assumption is not in doubt. President George Bush wants to get rid
of Saddam Hussein. To achieve that end, he is prepared to use, as he put it
at a press conference on 8 July, "all the tools at our disposal" – economic,
diplomatic, financial and military".

But the how, the when, the "what happens afterwards" are as unclear today as
when this administration started to train its sights upon Baghdad, even
before 11 September.

War, even a war as heavily trailed and potentially one-sided as one against
Iraq, is a jarring and horrible matter in which hundreds, probably thousands
of people will die – some of them Americans.

However, real debate has been non-existent. In the US, if not in Britain –
Washington's one likely ally in the venture – a new Iraq war is accepted as
inevitable. Public opinion has been numbed by the memory of 11 September,
the drumbeat of warnings about the "axis of evil" and the simplistic
either-for-us-or-against-us rhetoric of Mr Bush himself.

But now, belatedly, things may change. This week, the Senate Foreign
Relations committee will summon the top brass of the Bush administration to
explain its policy over Iraq. Do not expect announcement of an invasion
date. But the hearings should push the debate beyond press leaks and
sabre-rattling into the crucial realm of cause, execution and effect.

There are three ways for Washington to get rid of President Saddam: by
fomenting a coup, by encouraging a popular uprising, or by using military
force, which might well pave the way to a coup or an uprising.

The first on its own appears unlikely. The Iraqi leader has seen off plots
and coup attempts aplenty. Nor is there much sign that either Washington or
the opposition-in-exile, most notably the Iraqi National Congress (INC), has
agents in place to do the job. A popular uprising looks scarcely more
promising.

In 1995 the INC launched a "Three Cities" plan, posited on popular
insurrections in the oil towns of Mosul and Kirkuk in the north and Al
Basrah in the south – both in "no-fly-zones" patrolled by British and US
warplanes. But to no avail.

Which leaves the military option.

As President Bush and Tony Blair repeatedly assure, no final decision has
been taken. But that does not mean pretty detailed proposals have not been
put up by the planners.

Of the two most widely canvassed schemes, one follows the so-called "Afghan
model", whereby a combination of massive bombing, the introduction of US and
British elite forces and the local opposition would topple President Saddam.

The other is a conventional assault, essentially the "son of Desert Storm",
involving air attacks and an invasion by 250,000 troops – a force half the
size of the one Mr Bush's father sent to liberate Kuwait in 1991, but with
even deadlier weaponry and firepower.

Yesterday a third plan surfaced in the New York Times, essentially a
compromise between Variants One and Two. It is dubbed the "inside-out"
solution, a 21st century version of the blitzkrieg, employing massive
bombing and an attack – presumably by a large airborne force – on Baghdad
and a few key centres. This would supposedly trigger the overthrow of
President Saddam and the rapid collapse of his regime.

But argument rages in Washington over practically every issue. A portion of
the military is against a campaign, in whatever guise. This school maintains
that post-Gulf War "containment" has worked reasonably well. It holds that
President Saddam is less of a threat than he is cracked up to be, and that a
direct attack carries risks not justified by the potential reward

Others – again mainly generals in uniform at the Pentagon – believe that the
wisest course is a carefully plotted, comprehensive assault, ie Variant Two.

The real split, however, runs along the familiar faultline, pitting civilian
hawks like Vice-President Dick Cheney, the Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and Paul Wolfowitz, his deputy, against the more cautious military and that
old soldier on civvy street, Colin Powell, the Secretary of State. As
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he was the least enthusiastic member of the
high command in 1991 for the use of force to throw President Saddam out of
Kuwait.

The debate over attacking Iraq can perhaps best be understood if – like Gaul
by Caesar – it is divided into three parts: before, during and after.

The first problem for Mr Bush (and Mr Blair) is one of justification.

The simplest way, of course, would be certain proof of close ties between
Saddam Hussein and al-Qa'ida, best of all that he was in some way involved
with 11 September. That would remove many misgivings abroad, and provide an
underpinning of sorts for Mr Bush's new doctrine of "pre-emptive self
defence" against states believed likely to launch terrorist strikes against
the US.

Alas, such proof has not materialised. So the US and Britain are likely to
claim that Saddam's refusal to re-admit United Nations weapons inspectors is
justification enough for an attack – thus circumventing the UN Security
Council and an almost certain Russian or Chinese veto. The basis for this
claim is UNSC Resolution 678 of November 1990 authorising the US and others
"to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace
and security in the area".

That last provision covers the post-Gulf War Resolution 687 of April 1991,
setting up the current system for inspecting and destroying Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction. By refusing to have the UN inspectors back, Saddam is
in breach of this resolution and thus liable to attack under 687.

International policy lawyers are divided on precisely this point. Weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) also fuel the great uncertainty of the second period,
the war itself.

It is assumed Saddam has chemical and biological weapons, and a dozen or two
converted Scud missiles with which to deliver them, either against a big
concentration of US troops or Israel.

He is suspected too of at least working on a nuclear programme. With his
regime – and life – at stake, why should he not use them? Could the US, for
all its hi-tech wizardry, really eliminate these weapons by airstrikes
before they are used? Hence the misgivings inside the Pentagon.

But the largest uncertainties by far surround the third and final phase, the
aftermath. WMD or no WMD, the US would win a Second Gulf War, even if almost
every Arab state in the region opposed it, and its only ally in the field
were Britain (and perhaps France).

But then what? Hence the warning King Abdullah of Jordan is conveying when
he meets Mr Blair and Mr Bush this week. An attack, he and others of
Washington's wellwishers in the Arab world fear, would merely open a
"Pandora's box" of troubles – at least until there is real progress in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a sense favourable to the Palestinians.

Mr Bush may demand regime change in Baghdad and Ramallah. Privately most
Arabs wish he would press for a bit of regime change in Jerusalem. If the
Middle East conflict continues to rage, Mr Bush may find that a successful
war to remove Saddam may prove tragically counterproductive.

The US has not said what it believes a successor regime in Baghdad will look
like, let alone who will lead it. War therefore might force America to
station tens of thousands of troops in Iraq to keep the country together.

The US would thus be enmeshed in the "nationbuilding" Mr Bush so detests,
indeed in overt colonialism.

In the process, as it seeks to maintain Iraq's territorial unity, the US
might find itself fighting the Kurds in the north and the Shi'ites in the
south – the very people who have been its implicit allies against Saddam.
And around the Arab world, hatred of "American imperialists", and the
regimes which back them would only grow, creating new generations of
radicals and potential terrorists. Has Washington thought any of this
through?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings should give a first, partial
answer.

*********************************************************
I. Jordan's king and Labour MPs warn Blair on Iraq attack
By Paul Waugh Deputy Political Editor

Independent
30 July 2002

Tony Blair was told by King Abdullah of Jordan and his own Labour MPs
yesterday that a new United Nations mandate would be required before any
military action could be taken against Iraq.

The fresh pressure on the Prime Minister to seek a new UN resolution
followed The Independent's revelation yesterday that the Government's
lawyers had advised such a move. Downing Street refused to deny law officers
had given such a warning but said it was normal practice not to comment on
sensitive legal advice.

As Labour MPs urged Mr Blair to place the advice in the House of Commons,
King Abdullah made clear in his meeting with the Prime Minister that the
Middle East peace process needed new impetus before any action on Iraq could
be taken. King Abdullah, who had warned on the eve of his meeting that an
invasion on Baghdad would open a "Pandora's box", told Mr Blair of his deep
unease about speculation of an American assault.

Afterwards, Downing Street said the meeting was friendly but admitted the
subject of Iraq had been discussed as well as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Asked whether Mr Blair agreed that there was a direct link between
the issues, his spokesman would say only: "They are issues that have to be
addressed. He acknowledges there is a peace process [in the Middle East]
that needs to be energised, and there is an issue of weapons of mass
destruction [in Iraq]."

But the spokesman insisted that nothing had changed since Mr Blair told a
televised press conference last week that no decisions on action had been
taken and that any such action, if taken, would be in accordance with
international law.

The spokesman said the dossier on Saddam Hussein's regime the Government had
promised had not been published yet because "people might make a linkage and
think action was imminent". It was "the long-standing practice of successive
governments never to comment on advice it might or might not receive from
law officers." But Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for Linlithgow and Father of the
House of Commons, later wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, asking
him to place any legal advice the Government may have received on Iraq in
the House of Commons library.

The convention that legal advice to ministers remains confidential should be
waived so MPs can make an informed judgement on the implications of military
action, he said.

Mr Dalyell was backed by Bruce George, who chairs the Commons defence select
committee. He warned that Mr Blair could face strong opposition from
Parliament if he committed British forces to an attack, unless the argument
for military intervention had been made convincingly.

****************************************************
J. King of Jordan appeals to Blair on Iraq
By George Jones, Political Editor and Toby Harnden in Washington

Daily Telegraph
(Filed: 30/07/2002)

King Abdullah of Jordan told Tony Blair yesterday that the Arab world was
opposed to American-led military action against Iraq, as a new plan to oust
Saddam Hussein was leaked in Washington.

During a half-hour meeting at No 10, he insisted that resolving the crisis
between Israel and the Palestinians, rather than dealing with Iraq, should
be the priority.

But President Bush remains determined to topple Saddam. He is considering a
fresh plan, known as the "inside-out strategy", to attack Baghdad in the
hope of killing Saddam and forcing a swift collapse of his government,
rather than staging a re-run of the Gulf war.

Advocates of the plan, details of which appeared in the New York Times, say
it could help solve the problem of how to prevent Saddam from using chemical
and biological weapons against Israel or Turkey if American forces cornered
him.

Officials on both sides of the Atlantic emphasised that no final battle
plans had been drawn up and that military action was not imminent. The
debate about how to conduct the operation is still raging in the Pentagon
and the State Department.

Officials from the Pentagon and State Department are due to hold a meeting
with Iraqi opposition officials in Washington in the next fortnight.
Discussion will focus on who should lead Iraqi opposition forces and what
shape a post-Saddam Iraq would take.

Timoor Daghistani, the Jordanian ambassador to London, told Radio 4's The
World at One that King Abdullah had made "very clear" to Mr Blair his
opposition to an invasion.

"We do not support any military action against Iraq," he said. "We need to
see a peaceful resolution within the framework of [UN] Security Council
resolutions."

The ambassador added: "All the Arab countries as a whole have agreed that
they do not want to see any military action taken against Iraq."

Senior American sources have said that, while most Arab leaders have
publicly expressed sentiments similar to King Abdullah's, they have said in
private that they will support action against Saddam if it is decisive and
minimises civilian casualties.

King Abdullah is due to meet Mr Bush to repeat his calls for calm and to
urge Washington to maintain its Middle East engagement.

No 10 tried to play down any differences with the king and stressed that
action against Iraq was not imminent.

After meeting the king, the Prime Minister held private talks with Dr Rowan
Williams, the Archbishop-designate of Canterbury, who has made clear his
opposition to military action against Iraq.

Downing Street said it was a "getting to know you" meeting, as they had not
met before. Officials refused to be drawn on whether the archbishop had
reaffirmed his view that any attack on Iraq should be undertaken only with
UN approval.

Mr Bush's aides say that Mr Blair has told the president that he will commit
troops to action against Iraq. Shared intelligence has convinced both
governments that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction are a major threat.

But Downing Street insisted that nothing had changed since Mr Blair told a
televised press conference last week that no decisions on action had been
taken and that, if action were taken, it would be in accordance with
international law.

A dossier on Saddam's regime that the Government has promised had not been
published yet because "people might make a link and think that action was
imminent".

Downing Street refused to be drawn on reports that Government law officers
had said that British participation in an invasion of Iraq would be illegal
without a new UN mandate.

The Government failed to stem the growing unease on its back benches.

Bruce George, Labour chairman of the Commons defence select committee, said
that an American-led attack on Iraq would be far easier to justify if it
were sanctioned by a fresh and specific UN resolution.

He said that, unless the argument for military intervention were made
convincingly, Mr Blair could face strong opposition from Parliament if he
committed forces to an attack.

Tam Dalyell, a Labour backbencher, warned Mr Blair that military action
against Iraq could mean committing Britain to maintaining an armed presence
in the area for decades.

*************************************************
K. The world after Saddam

Daily Telegraph
(Filed: 30/07/2002)

As speculation mounts about the kind of campaign the Americans will launch
to overthrow Saddam Hussein, allied misgivings are becoming more pronounced.

Yesterday the New York Times reported that Washington was thinking of going
straight for the jugular by attacking Baghdad and key military centres, in
the hope that the Ba'ath regime would quickly crumble.

At the same time, King Abdullah of Jordan told Tony Blair that the Arab
world opposed an assault on Iraq; priority should be given, rather, to
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. That is a view widely held by
members of the European Union.

The implicit assumption of those urging restraint on America is that the
present situation is better than anything that might flow from Saddam's
demise. That is to hold out very little hope both for the UN and for the
Middle East.

The Iraqi tyrant has done everything he can to thwart the resolutions passed
by the Security Council after his forces had been driven out of Kuwait in
1991. The key moment in that pattern of obstruction was the collapse in 1998
of the UN Special Commission (Unscom).

Since then, Iraq has been free of international weapons inspectors. The
Clinton administration acquiesced in that defiance of UN authority. There is
no reason why its successor should do the same, all the more so since the
terrorist attacks last September.

Nine days after that horror, George W. Bush told Congress that his quarrel
was not only with al-Qa'eda and the Taliban but with any government that
provided aid to terrorists.

Although no direct link has been found between Baghdad and the September 11
hijackers, its support for terrorist action against America and Israel is
beyond doubt.

Ten years ago, it was implicated in a plot to assassinate former President
Bush during his visit to Kuwait. And since the start of the second
Palestinian uprising, Saddam has proved himself the staunchest backer of
suicide bombers by giving cash to their families.

Such an enemy will not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction to
advance its cause. Saddam has already demonstrated that degree of
ruthlessness by his gassing of the Kurds in Halabja in 1988.

It would be wise to assume that, since the departure of Unscom, he has done
everything possible to enhance his capacity to bully his neighbours and
deter the West by building up stocks of biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons. That arsenal is a clear threat to world peace.

Given Saddam's record of internal oppression and external aggression, his
removal from power alone is a great prize. But the impact of his fall would
be much greater than that. It would fire a powerful shot across the bows of
all states that sponsor terrorism.

It would serve as a warning to would-be nuclear-armed powers such as Iran.
It would remove an important prop to those Palestinians and their backers
who would drive Israel into the sea.

It is more difficult to predict what might take the place of the present
regime in Baghdad. But if it were a democratic government representing all
Iraqis, the effect on the Middle East could be revolutionary.

In its campaign for good governance, the West has, for strategic reasons
connected with oil, made an exception of the region. The result has been to
entrench authoritarian, corrupt regimes. The removal of the most egregious,
in Iraq, could lead to the collapse of clerical rule in Iran and the
isolation of the Ba'athist government in Syria.

At the same time, moves towards parliamentary democracy in states such as
Bahrain and Jordan could be hastened. The overall result, it has to be
admitted, could be the arrival in government of Islamic radicals whose cause
has been aided by the shortcomings of current power-holders: Egypt and Saudi
Arabia come to mind. But that is not sufficient reason to leave the Middle
East in its present, deeply unsatisfactory state.

During the Cold War, the West united in Nato to protect itself from Soviet
attack, but also because it believed in the value of democracy. In the age
of terror heralded by September 11, military might could again bring about
the political transformation of a region deprived for too long of a proper
voice.

Rather than distancing themselves from America in this quest, the European
democracies should wholeheartedly embrace it.

****************************************************************
L. Raid on Baghdad is key to new US Iraq battle plan
By Toby Harnden in Washington

Daily Telegraph
(Filed: 30/07/2002)


The Bush administration has stepped up planning for the toppling of Saddam
Hussein and is considering an assault on Baghdad that could kill him or
cause his government to collapse.

Known as the "inside-out" approach, the new plan envisages a strike at the
heart of Saddam's regime followed by further attacks radiating outwards -
effectively the reverse of the 1991 Gulf war plan.

It has won some favour because it would entail the use of only about 70,000
troops and could prevent Saddam or his supporters launching chemical or
biological attacks against countries such as Israel or Turkey.

A formal battle plan has not been drawn up by the Pentagon and is unlikely
to reach President George W Bush's desk until the end of the summer.
Officials have emphasised that a variety of options are still being
considered.

Details of the inside-out strategy were leaked to the New York Times, which
this month published parts of a proposed plan for a full-scale invasion of
Iraq from the north, south and west involving some 250,000 troops.

Senior sources have since said that such a large force might not be
necessary, though the so-called Afghan model of a surgical air strike
supplemented by special forces and Iraqi opposition fighters is now largely
discredited.

The "inside-out" strategy is to attack Baghdad and one or two other key
command centres and weapons depots. Because Saddam's regime is so
centralised, this could cause his government to implode, leaving his forces
paralysed.

Like virtually all the military options being discussed in Washington, the
plan envisages the use of a substantial British force but no significant
contribution from other allies.

The strike against Baghdad, which is protected by Saddam's best-trained
troops, would probably come from the air at first and then continue with
combined airborne and ground assaults.

The greatest attraction of a swift attack is that it could solve the
conundrum of how to stop Saddam using weapons of mass destruction even
though he would know that he was about to be ousted and probably killed by
American-led forces.

Earlier this month, a senior Bush administration official told The Telegraph
that the problem of how to prevent Saddam responding to an attack with "a
kind of Hitler's bunker type of mentality" was the most difficult issue
being grappled with by the White House.

Planning had "to take fundamental account of the prospect of Saddam doing
something completely irrational", he said, because Saddam "already has
strategic warning so he's not going to sit there".

The same official dismissed the concerns of some senior Pentagon officers
who have said only a full-scale invasion would work. "It's like any
bureaucracy - if you ask for a solution you'll get 48 reasons why it is
difficult to do.

"The generals want as many troops as possible for safety reasons. They're
all worried that if the operation fails they'll be the ones who get the
blame."

Iraqi opposition sources in Washington have cautioned that some of the leaks
about military options could be attempts to hoodwink Saddam. "We think there
is an element of misinformation here," said a Kurdish official. "Otherwise
why would this stuff be being leaked?"

***********************************************
M. King warns Blair on Iraq invasion
By David Charter, Chief Political Correspondent

The Times
30 July

KING ABDULLAH of Jordan told Tony Blair yesterday that dialogue was the only
way to deal with Iraq, and that any attack on that country would have a
devastating effect on the region.

After the frank exchange of views at Downing Street, the Prime Minister can
have been left in no doubt of the King’s opinion that progress in the Middle
East would be affected by any action the West might take against President
Saddam Hussein. Downing Street described the meeting as positive and said
that Mr Blair’s position on Iraq was unchanged. The Government’s stance was
that no decision had been made on military action, but Saddam must comply
with UN resolutions.

The King, who takes his anti-war message to President Bush tomorrow, urged
Mr Blair to play his part in producing the Middle East action plan he
described in his interview in The Times yesterday.

A spokesman for the King said: “His Majesty stressed the need to intensify
and co-ordinate the efforts of the international community . . . to develop
a clear plan with a timetable in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe
in the Palestinian territories.

“The lack of food and medicine due to the curfews and embargoes enforced by
the Israeli Government, in addition to the demolition of homes and of the
Palestinian infrastructure, has placed the Palestinian people in a critical
situation and is a major impediment to peace.”

On Iraq, King Abdullah “reiterated Jordan’s firm belief that dialogue based
on UN Security Council resolutions is the only way to defuse the situation”.
The King added that military action against Iraq would have devastating
effects.

The talks are taking place amid growing unease on the Labour back benches
about a possible military strike. Mr Blair’s official spokesman said of his
meeting with King Abdullah: “It was a very friendly and positive meeting, as
always. The Prime Minister and the King have a very good relationship.

“It was a wide-ranging discussion, focused on the Middle East and on the
different issues you would expect, chiefly on how we can make progress on
the Middle East peace process. Obviously, Iraq was one of the subjects that
would have come up.”

The spokesman said that the promised dossier on Saddam’s weapons of mass
destruction had not been published because “people might make a linkage and
think action was imminent”. Downing Street refused to comment on reports
that Mr Blair had been told by lawyers that any participation in an invasion
of Iraq would be illegal without a new UN mandate.

Tam Dalyell, the veteran Labour backbencher, warned Mr Blair that military
action could mean committing Britain to an armed presence in the area for
decades. In a letter to the Prime Minister, Mr Dalyell asked: “Is it
contemplated occupying a resentful Iraq — and having been there in 1994 and
1998, I think it will be resentful — for my expected lifetime and possibly
yours?” Mr Dalyell urged the Prime Minister to heed the advice of Field
Marshal Lord Bramall, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, who used a
letter to The Times yesterday to say that although the US has the military
might to topple Saddam, by doing so it might “pour petrol on the flames” of
the troubled Middle East.

 *****************************************************************
N. Baghdad strike would aim for jugular
By Roland Watson in Washington and Michael Binyon

The Times
30 July

AMERICAN military planners are exploring the high-risk option of trying to
seize Baghdad with the initial thrust of an attack aimed at toppling
President Saddam Hussein.

The aim would be to paralyse Iraq’s highly centralised command structure,
preventing Saddam from striking back with chemical and biological weapons.
Iraqi generals and their troops would also be quicker to desert if they
believed Saddam had been swiftly rendered powerless, under the scenario
sketched out by Pentagon officials.

The “inside-out” approach would be the reverse of the 1991 Gulf War
strategy. Although the coalition offensive opened with huge airstrikes on
the Iraqi capital, the overall strategy was aimed at driving Saddam’s army
out of Kuwait, and stopped short of pursuing fleeing troops to Baghdad.

The Baghdad-first plan, leaked to The New York Times, hinges on the mobility
of US forces, and their ability to strike over long distances. The
attraction of the proposal, one of several battle plans yet to be finalised,
is that it would require fewer troops than the 250,000 envisaged in earlier
planning.

Because Saddam’s regime is highly authoritarian and centred on Baghdad, it
would be possible to paralyse Iraq’s chain of command by taking one or two
key centres, according to the planners. Arab sources also suggested that the
Iraqi Army might crumble quickly under a sustained assault.

The emphasis on speed could also help to convince moderate Arab leaders to
lend tacit support, or at least to hold back their opposition. Many share
the goal of ridding the region of Saddam, but are concerned that a lengthy
campaign will bring greater instability.

Mr Bush will be quizzed about his plans tomorrow by King Abdullah of Jordan,
who said in a Times interview yesterday that it would be a mistake for the
US to strike at Iraq without making progress towards a Middle East peace.

Senior Arab politicians believe that the pressure in Washington for an early
attack on Iraq is easing. Nevertheless, they believe that America is
committed to taking action, although this is likely to be put back until
early next year, instead of in October or November.

“The military assessment is not complete. Many of the generals are now
asking what should be done after any attack. Will the US occupy Baghdad?”
one source said.

The “inside-out” battle plan is the latest leak from the Pentagon. Analysts
suggest that some of the leaking is to demonstrate to Saddam the seriousness
of American intent. Donald Rumsfeld, the Defence Secretary, has threatened
any leaker with prosecution, although the effect of the stories has been to
help to persuade Arab leaders that the time is fast approaching when they
need to make a choice.

Tony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, said that the latest plan was one of a number of
different concepts.

Mr Rumsfeld is overseeing the planning of an operation about which much of
Europe has deep misgivings. Mr Bush will see a plan only when Mr Rumsfeld
and Tommy Franks, the Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command which
oversees the region, have whittled down the options.

Mr Cordesman said that the concept of a swift strike on Baghdad might
reflect the trouble Washington was having in persuading allies in the
region, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to allow US access.

“The ‘light’ option is certainly something that has more credibility than
sending in 250,000 men,” he said. “It may not be nearly as light as a few
tens of thousands and it may have to have sufficient heavy back-up. But the
idea of bypassing most cities and thrusting for Baghdad is certainly a
credible option.”

Although Mr Bush is likely to win support from Congress for military action
against Iraq, senators believe that the Administration needs to make more of
a case.

Joe Biden, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is due to
start hearings this week. “This is just beginning to raise the issue: what’s
at stake here, what’s the nature of the threat, when we go in, and if we go
in,” he said. “Will it require tens of thousands of troops to be there for
three, four, five years? These are questions the American public has a right
to have some knowledge about.”

 ************************************************
O. Dangers in gamble of going for a city too far
By Michael Evans, Defence Editor

The Times
30 July

THE latest military option for toppling Saddam Hussein is the highest-risk
venture so far to emerge from the leaky Pentagon.

The Americans could learn from Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,
who dispatched 30,000 allied paratroops behind enemy lines in 1944 to
capture Arnhem and seven bridges on the Dutch-German border. Monty gambled
that a narrow, penetrating assault deep behind enemy lines would have
greater impact than a classic advance along a broad front.

But Arnhem proved “a bridge too far”. Nearly 1,500 soldiers from the British
Parachute Division lost their lives. Operation Market Garden failed.
“Baghdad might prove to be a city too far for the Americans if they go for
it direct,” one military source said.

Seizing key areas of Baghdad in a first strike has the attraction of being
bold. It would offer more chance of tactical surprise than a slow build-up
of forces in Kuwait and an attritional advance towards Saddam’s capital. But
the risks would be huge, and since the horrors of Vietnam and Somalia, the
US has become risk-averse.

Is President Bush prepared to drop the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions
into Baghdad’s streets, hoping that they could grab the Iraqi leader before
he escapes? Military men believe that risk-taking is essential for victory.
However, in this modern era of warfare, Mr Bush is unlikely to risk losing
hundreds of troops in urban street-fighting.

The key to a successful assault on Baghdad would be Intelligence — the
precise locations of Saddam’s command centres, bodyguard units, and three
Republican Guard armoured divisions around Baghdad. In Afghanistan, however,
there have been many examples of faulty or imprecise Intelligence which has
led to bombing errors and civilian casualties.

If the “Baghdad-first” option were to be selected by Mr Bush in trying to
effect a regime change in Iraq, the American military would be fighting an
urban war, not a rerun of the 1991 desert war. The risk of “collateral
damage” — civilian deaths — would be much greater in Baghdad than in
Afghanistan.

The Pentagon’s leaks may just be about “psyops” — psychological operations
aimed at generating stories to scare the Iraqi regime. To date we have had
the Gulf War II option, involving a land-sea-air campaign with 250,000
troops invading from all directions; the special forces option, involving
relatively few troops linked up with Iraqi opposition groups; and now the
middle option, with about 50,000 troops deployed. More likely, the Americans
are scratching their heads over what to do about Saddam.

***********************************************************












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