[casi] from today's papers: 31-07-02

["Voices uk" <voices@DELETETHISviwuk.freeserve.co.uk>]

A. 'UN must sanction' Iraq strike, Guardian, 31 July
B. America's plan to invade Iraq is just a giant bluff, Independent, 31 July
[opinion piece by Mary Dejevsky]
C. US faces daunting threat to economy in event of Iraq war, Independent, 31
July
D. Unions tell Blair: no war on Iraq, Daily Telegraph, 31 July
E. If we must go to war, for God's sake tell us why, The Times, 31 July
[opinion piece by Simon Jenkins]

Guardian: letters@guardian.co.uk
Independent: letters@independent.co.uk
Telegraph: dtletters@telegraph.co.uk
Times: letters@the-times.co.uk

[Letter-writers: remember to include your address and telephone # and that
The Times requires exclusivity]

Of the above, B and E seem the most likely candidates for responses. In B
Mary Dejevsky writes that whilst she 'might well have joined the protests'
against the prospect of war with Iraq, she hadsn't bothered because she
doesn't think it's going to happen. After all, she writes,  '[t]he whole
edifice rests on the premise ... that Bush is a gun-toting bully.' In E
Simon Jenkins lists several 'objections' to a war with Iraq but fails to
mention the potential humanitarian repercussions.

Best wishes,

Gabriel
voices uk

******************************************************************
A. 'UN must sanction' Iraq strike
by John Hooper in Berlin and Richard Norton-Taylor

Wednesday July 31, 2002
The Guardian

The leaders of Germany and France highlighted the gap now separating Britain
and the US from some of their closest allies on policy towards Iraq
yesterday, saying they could not support an attack without a UN mandate.
At the end of talks in the German city of Schwerin, Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder and President Jacques Chirac insisted that clear UN approval was
necessary.

They reiterated their position amid the growing evidence that George Bush
and Tony Blair have agreed in principle on an invasion, perhaps before the
year is out.

Mr Blair has persistently ducked the issue when questioned about the need
for a new UN security council resolution, though he has implied that it
would not be necessary.

Although he said at his press conference last week that any action would be
taken in accordance with international law, he added that Saddam Hussein had
already breached 23 UN resolutions.

The Bush administration has made it clear that a US attack on Iraq would not
require any further UN mandate.

Mr Chirac urged President Saddam to agree "very, very quickly" to the return
of UN weapons inspectors, and his warning appeared to indicate that he feels
he has slightly greater room for manoeuvre than that enjoyed by Mr Schröder.

Mr Schröder, recalling that German military deployment abroad needed
parliamentary approval, said: "There is no majority, on one side or the
other, for taking part in military action without approval by the United
Nations."

Asked whether such an attack could still be avoided, Mr Chirac said: "I do
not want to imagine an attack against Iraq, an attack which - were it to
happen - could only be justified if it were decided on by the security
council."

******************************************************
B. Mary Dejevsky: America's plan to invade Iraq is just a giant bluff
The whole edifice rests on the premise, more readily accepted in Europe,
that Bush is a gun-toting bully

Independent
31 July 2002

US faces daunting threat to economy in event of Iraq war

Mary Dejevsky: America's plan to invade Iraq is just a giant bluff

For the umpteenth time this year, informed opinion on both sides of the
Atlantic is working itself into a panic about an imminent American assault
on Iraq. By my approximate count, we have now been treated to at least three
detailed plans of military action, thanks to leaks from the Pentagon. And
scarcely a day goes by without someone in the US administration insisting
that Iraq represents so potent and immediate a threat that the only
responsible course is pre-emptive: to eliminate Saddam Hussein before he
eliminates us.

Here in Britain, the Prime Minister infuriated MPs by telling them that he
would not necessarily recall Parliament before joining a US-led military
assault. He then tried to reassure the rest of us by saying that no decision
on military action had been taken and that any such operation, if indeed it
happened, was some time away. There followed predictable squawks of protest
from predictable quarters about everything from the humiliation of pandering
to Washington to the dangers of desert warfare.

Now, I might well have joined the protests – an attack on Iraq seems
ill-advised for all the well-rehearsed reasons – but for one thing. I just
do not believe that well-publicised US preparations for attacking Iraq are
anything other than an elaborate feint on the part of the Bush
administration, in likely collusion with the British government. Its purpose
is to neutralise the threat from Iraq without the use of miilitary force.

The whole edifice rests on the premise, more readily accepted in Europe than
in the US, that the Bush administration is a gun-toting bully, ready to use
force at the slightest provocation. While the belligerent language used by
Mr Bush and his senior defence officials fosters that image, the reality is
different. Mr Bush displayed extreme caution before ordering US forces into
Afghanistan. The operation was mounted only after careful planning and its
primary aim was not to remove the Taleban, but to catch those responsible
for 11 September. Contingency plans were in place for the event that the
Taleban fell and for the capture of Kabul, but only through the Northern
Alliance forces.

The guiding principle was to expose US forces to the least possible risk. If
such restraint was exercised in planning the Afghan operation, it is hard to
believe that Washington would act precipitately against Iraq.

With Afghanistan, the use of armed force was unquestionably justified in
response to attacks that were universally recognised as acts of war. Iraq
has neither threatened nor undertaken any such attacks. Whether it is even
potentially capable of doing so is in doubt. While rhetorically belligerent,
the Bush administration is not about to launch an all-out attack on Iraq
that it cannot win quickly and with minimal casualties. So long as the top
brass is warning that this cannot be guaranteed, it will not happen.

In fact, the more elaborate Washington's threats against Iraq have become,
the less credible they seem. Take the variety of scenarios emerging from the
Pentagon. The first envisaged a three-pronged attack on Iraq involving
200,000 troops converging from neighbouring countries. The latest, reported
in The New York Times, recommends seizing key cities, starting with Baghdad,
to overthrow Saddam Hussein and neutralise Iraq's weapons capability.

Such news reports create the impression that these scenarios are real plans
representing imminent courses of action. But that is to exaggerate their
significance. They are merely options, such as any responsible
administration commissions from its defence department all the time. That
they have seen the light of day, prematurely or at all, is more likely to
reflect dissent in the defence establishment than a decision already taken.

Consider also the publicity given to Iraqi exiles in recent weeks. Ahmed
Chalabi, the US-based head of the Iraqi National Congress, courted the
Clinton administration in the hope that it would recognise the his group as
a government in exile. His hopes were never realised. After being initially
cold-shouldered by Mr Bush, Mr Chalabi tried again in the new post-11
September circumstances. He was rewarded by a series of interviews in US and
European newspapers. Three weeks ago, there was a much-reported gathering of
300 leading Iraqi exiles in London, to discuss – it was said – the formation
of a government in exile. The meeting came and went, a committee was formed,
a promised announcement of government members last week was postponed. It is
now scheduled to take place in Washington in two weeks' time.

Since when have conspirators deliberately held their meetings in the glare
of publicity? Kensington Town Hall, where the exiles met, is hardly a
low-key venue. Like the hyperbolic war-talk from the Pentagon, the public
progress of the government in exile seems calculated less to conquer or
pacify Iraq than to attract maximum attention. The clear purpose here is not
to act, but to scare.

To scare convincingly, of course, the scare tactics must be realistic. And
even with a public as simultaneously apprehensive and aggressive as
America's after 11 September, there is the danger that the Bush
administration's bluff will eventually be called. This is where Britain has
been so useful. While reportedly urging caution on the Americans behind the
scenes, Mr Blair has publicly bolstered the notion of Iraq as a long-term
threat whenever the presumption of Saddam Hussein's wickedness has seemed to
pall.

In the cold light of day, the fact is that the US is still engaged
militarily in Afghanistan. Would it really open up a new and riskier front
in Iraq? The region is volatile. It is only two months since India and
Pakistan came within a whisker of war over Kashmir. Saudi Arabia looks far
less stable than the US would like its chief oil supplier to be.

The prospect of a truce, let alone peace, in the Middle East dwindles by the
day, leaving Washington's chief regional ally, Israel, perilously exposed.
That, according to Donald Rumsfeld this week, was an additional reason why
the threat from Iraq has to be averted as a matter of urgency.

This is not a view shared by Arab leaders in the region, as the King of
Jordan made clear during his visit to London. Nor is it a view shared by
most opponents of US military action against Iraq, in Europe and the US. But
the more distinguished and articulate the opposition, the more realistic the
likelihood of an attack appears – and the more effective the feint.

The first time that the Bush administration said it would take the fight to
Iraq, soon after US bombing had toppled the Taleban, the threat sounded
credible. Now that it has been served up for the third, fourth and fifth
time, it sounds absurd. I have only two concerns. The British and Europeans
clearly hope that Iraq can be scared in to complying with UN resolutions on
arms inspections. The Bush administration would clearly like the pressure to
result in Saddam's overthrow: will these scenarios come into conflict, and
if so which would prevail?

The second concern is a doubt about President Bush. Would he be tempted to
move from threatening Iraq to action if Republicans looked likely to suffer
heavy losses in the November Congressional elections? I hope not; but that
such a thought is even thinkable reflects the depth of Mr Bush's image
problem abroad.

***********************************************
C. US faces daunting threat to economy in event of Iraq war
By Andrew Buncombe in Washington

Independent
31 July 2002

An American military strike against Iraq could have such a negative effect
on the US economy that the type of operation chosen by President George Bush
and his advisers to oust Saddam Hussein could be influenced by its cost.

Almost every week, details of the latest plan being considered by the
Pentagon to topple the Iraqi dictator are leaked to the press. But yesterday
it was claimed that a big factor in the plan eventually selected would be
its cost. This judgement is based on the likelihood that, unlike the Gulf
War in 1991, the cost of any operation on Iraq would have to be borne
largely by the US.

The cost of any operation has not yet been worked out because Mr Bush and
his planners have not decided which option to pursue. Various plans call for
a pre-emptive strike against Baghdad, a massive operation involving 250,000
US troops, or fomenting insurrection by Iraqi opposition groups.

But with the Bush administration committed to "regime change" within Iraq,
increasing attention is being given to the cost and the possible effect on
the US economy. In particular, officials are concerned about the possible
effect on oil prices, which rose sharply in 1991 after disruption to supply.

"When weapons start going off in the Middle East, markets generally go down,
gold prices go up and oil prices shoot to the moon," James Placke, a former
US diplomat with experience in the Gulf, said. "And I expect this is the
short-term pattern we can reasonably anticipate."

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan and the US divided the $60bn (£38bn) cost of the
Gulf War. It is estimated the US would have to pay for 80 per cent of a new
operation. Each of the three other countries that helped pay for the 1991
operation have indicated they do not wish to contribute this time.

*****************************************************************
D. Unions tell Blair: no war on Iraq
By Andy McSmith, Chief Political Correspondent

Daily Telegraph
(Filed: 31/07/2002)

Ten trade union leaders issued a joint warning to Tony Blair yesterday not
to involve Britain in an American-led invasion of Iraq.

Critics suspect that President George W Bush plans to launch a strike to
remove Saddam Hussein before the first anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attacks.

The general secretaries of 10 unions, led by Bill Morris of the transport
workers, issued a statement saying public opinion in Britain was opposed to
a war with Iraq.

"Claims that Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction are strongly
disputed by most Western experts," they said. "We agree that there is no
evidence that Iraq represents a threat to the US or anybody else."

Other union leaders backing the appeal represent fire crews, post workers,
journalists, print workers, rail staff, train drivers, probation officers
and university lecturers.

Alice Mahon and Tam Dalyell, two Labour MPs prominent in the campaign
against a war with Iraq, said the unions' statement was a further sign that
Mr Blair was isolated in his backing for the US position.

***********************************************************
E. If we must go to war, for God's sake tell us why
by Simon Jenkins

The Times
31 July

This is becoming surreal. Soldiers do not want a war. Diplomats do not want
a war. Politicians do not want a war. This is exactly how wars start.
When Tony Blair was asked at a press conference last week about an early
attack on Iraq his body language went absent without leave. His cheek
muscles twitched, his eyes darted and he reached beneath his desk for help.
Was he seeking a panic button or a White House messager? The answer was
worse. He raised a comfort mug to hide his lips and took a large caffein
hit. He stumbled out a no comment.

I cannot recall a time when British policy towards a troubled part of the
world was so incoherent. Mr Blair has no clue what America intends to do in
Iraq. This is understandable since, as yet, nor does America. But other
governments are not thereby reduced to treating their publics as idiots.
Britons are served a burble of “no decision ... not ready ... weapons of
mass destruction ... regime change in Baghdad... nothing imminent”. Yet
every leak conveys a Government preparing for war. Mr Blair is like an East
European leader in the Soviet era, forced to support anything Moscow does
without knowing what it is.

Let us help poor Mr Blair in his predicament. Let us examine the case for a
war. The customary reason would be that Saddam Hussein threatens the
security of the British State and the lives of its citizens. Mr Blair has
been unable to convince anyone of this. He must therefore fall back on a
generalised threat posed by the Iraqi leader to the outside world, one so
grave as to justify early military intervention.

That threat is conceivable. Saddam controls a big and rich country.Whereas
the Taleban merely gave houseroom to those planning an attack on Western
targets, Saddam has gone to war with two neighbours and with some effect.
Nobody studying the reports of the last United Nations weapons inspectors
could doubt that he must still have nasty chemical and bacteriological
weapons. He used them against Kurds and Shias. The arrival of Russian
nuclear technicians also suggests that Iraq is trying to put them to evil
purpose.

These activities are not new. Countering them has been the objective of 11
years of so-called “containment”. This has involved economic sanctions,
ostracism and regular bombing. Mr Blair appears to feel that the containment
policy has failed. As many predicted, it has weakened Saddam’s opponents and
made him, on one estimate, the sixth richest man on earth. It may have
enabled him to replenish his arsenal.

If so, containment has indeed been a catastrophe. But its failure does not
necessarily negate the need for war. Mr Blair now hints that Saddam not only
has nasty weapons — as do many unpleasant states — but that he intends to
use them against the West. This is a wholly different matter. It suggests
that Saddam’s past stance, dedicated to cementing himself in power in his
region, has now changed. Mr Blair even hints that he may be employing the
al-Qaeda network, which is still a threat to the West according to
bloodcurdling and recession-inducing statements from Washington. That
presumably is why the Government yesterday denied habeas corpus to suspects
it seems incapable of bringing to trial.

If all these alarming assumptions are true, the war games being played in
Washington and London make some sense. Should American and British forces
march directly on Baghdad? Should they occupy a region of Iraq and proceed
only with surrogates? Should they go “Baghdad-lite” and use bombers and
paratroops against the capital alone, relying on Saddam’s enemies to rise up
and depose him? The ghosts of Beau Geste and Lawrence of Arabia are stalking
the war rooms of Nato. What to the country at large may seem unreal and
implausible is to Mr Blair a desperate crisis. As he puts it over and again,
despite a decade of containment “inaction is not an option”.

The first objection to any war is that it may be lost. The American military
has a dreadful record in trying to topple declared enemies. In Cuba, Libya,
Somalia, Serbia and now Afghanistan, a named individual was targeted and
survived. Assassination attempts against Castro, Gaddafi, Aideed, Milosevic
and bin Laden gave all of them a sudden elixir of life. Aideed died in his
bed. Milosevic lost power only to a democratic vote. The rest are said to be
going strong. As Gaddafi might reflect, an American precision bomb is the
next best thing to immortality.

Yet America can surely defeat Iraq. While President Bush may survive his
failure to capture bin Laden, he could hardly excuse a failure to eliminate
Saddam when “regime change” was his sole objective. Provided an invasion is
sufficiently massive, there is no reason why “the mother of all victories”
should not be achieved. The Republican Guard may exact a heavy price. But
with Baghdad laid to waste and to hell with collateral damage, regime change
is surely do-able.

A second objection to a war is whether, though winnable, it is “legal”. To
that we may reply, so what? No particular legality attached to the bombing
of Belgrade or Kabul, in both of which Britain participated. As America has
made plain, it regards international jurisprudence as a discipline for
losers, not winners. George Bush and his Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld,
never cease to assert that war on Iraq is not an act of international
policing, demanding United Nations authorisation. It is a matter of American
self-defence. In such cases, international law is indulgent.

This may not help Mr Blair. He appears to see this war as partly
self-defence but partly moral crusade. For the latter he needs more
authority than a phone call from Mr Bush, especially as he means to
disregard his own Parliament. But a poodle knows only one master. I suspect
that the United Nations will not feature prominently in Britain’s “war aims”
against Iraq.

A third objection to war is quite different — that all my assumptions above
are not true and that a war is unnecessary. The aggression which it means to
forestall is not real. The evidence is not sufficient to justify bloodshed
and destruction. This objection would point out that the containment policy
towards Iraq has not failed. It has merely not succeeded. After the Gulf
War, America made a mistake. It should have treated Saddam as it now treats
Libya, Syria, Iran and other dictatorships, and as it once treated Saddam
himself. It should have smothered him with “constructive engagement”. That
was the way to keep tabs on him. To attack Iraq when Saddam’s standing is
high in the region is, as Lord Bramall wrote on Monday, to fan the flames of
anti-Americanism and set al-Qaeda back on the recruiting path.

I would love to see Saddam go. He is a thoroughly nasty job of work with a
nasty arsenal at his disposal. I would scheme in every way to bring about
his downfall. But Britain must have a casus belli, a reason to wage
aggression against a foreign state. Mr Blair has none. He taps his nose and
says in effect, “I will have a reason when I have a reason”. But this is
extraordinary. There is no known or leaked evidence that Saddam is about to
attack Britain or anyone else. There is no reason for him to do so. The only
reason is recklessly supplied by the Prime Minister, that Saddam should now
regard Britain as an enemy and retaliate first.

If America wants to go to war with Iraq that is America’s business, on a
rationale buried deep in the psychology of the Bush Administration.America’s
friends are not being “anti-American” in questioning it, any more than her
critics help by failing to understand the continued catatonic state of
American foreign policy since September 11. But Britain has no influence in
Washington and need not pretend otherwise. America will do what it chooses.
Besides, Americans are perfectly able to hold their own leaders to account,
more outspokenly than Britons seem able to hold Mr Blair.

An American war is not always a sufficient condition for a British war. If
the Government is right and al-Qaeda remains a threat to Britain the more
reason for caution in the minefields of Middle East politics. It is a reason
for listening and watching, not blundering into the region with bombs and
tanks. But if Mr Blair knows something nobody else knows, if he knows why
“inaction is not an option”, surely he has a duty to tell us what that
something is.






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