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News, 11-18/10/02 (5) WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION * Film Probes German-Iraq Nuclear Link * Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment * North Korea has what Iraq dreams of * U.S. Approaches to N. Korea And Iraq Are Vastly Different MIDDLE EAST/ARAB WORLD * A grim reminder of Iraq's tawdry evil * Bahrain calls for Arab summit to discuss Iraq crisis * UN's Iraq decision not binding, says Prince * Saudi Arabia won't take part in Iraq attack: Saudi FM * Syria expects U.S. to launch attack on Iraq * War Games Held in Southern Jordan * Key US headquarters move to Kuwait * Qatar Opposes Any U.S. War on Iraq, Considering Bases * Iraq accuses Iran of 53 ceasefire violations WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/w-me/2002/oct/13/101300705.html * FILM PROBES GERMAN-IRAQ NUCLEAR LINK by Charles J. Hanley Las Vegas Sun (from AP), 13th October NEW YORK- A new investigative film traces the roots of the Iraq nuclear crisis to links between German industry and Baghdad's bomb builders, and questions the lenient sentence - probation - handed a German engineer for treason in aiding the project. The documentary, "Stealing the Fire," also offers a rare close-up look at a "proliferator," the engineer Karl-Heinz Schaab, who emerges on film as a bland, gray, fastidious 68-year-old technician who protests he's "too small to be turned into a scapegoat for the others." The film, produced and directed by Oscar-winning documentarian John S. Friedman and Eric Nadler, premieres Tuesday at a New York theater. Blueprints and other documents Schaab and associates brought to Iraq in the late 1980s, along with Schaab's own hands-on skills, were a vital boost to Baghdad's development of gas centrifuges - machines whose ultra-fast spinning "enriches" uranium by separating U 235, the stuff of nuclear bombs, from non-fissionable U-238. Much of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure was subsequently wrecked by American and allied bombing in the 1991 Gulf War and in 1998. More was destroyed during U.N. inspections inside Iraq in the 1990s, and Baghdad officials deny they are working on atomic weapons today. But reconnaissance photos released by the Bush administration this week, as it seeks support for a potential war against Iraq, indicate the Iraqis have been rebuilding sites previously used for nuclear development. A newly released U.S. intelligence report says they may have nuclear weapons by 2010. "Stealing the Fire" looks at the source of these capabilities. Iraq was failing with other enrichment technologies when German centrifuge experts Bruno Stemmler and Walter Busse, recruited by a German company, H&H Metallform, came to Baghdad in 1988 and sold the Iraqis old designs for centrifuges. The next year they brought Schaab, who provided components, technical reports and, most important, a stolen design for an advanced "supercritical" centrifuge. The design, classified secret in Germany, was used in enriching nuclear power fuel at the European government consortium Urenco, for which a small Schaab-owned company worked as a subcontractor. The Iraqis paid $62,000 for the key documents. In an on-film interview, Schaab says that on his last Baghdad visit, in April 1990, he personally helped install Iraq's first test centrifuge. Bomb-making would require thousands of such centrifuges. A German court eventually - on June 29, 1999 - convicted Schaab of treason and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment and a $32,000 fine, but then suspended the prison term because he previously served 15 months in a Brazilian jail. He had fled to Brazil in 1995 after U.N. inspectors uncovered documents in Iraq exposing the German connection. At Germany's request the following year, the Brazilians arrested the fugitive engineer, but freed him when a Brazilian court held that his alleged crime was political and he could not be extradited. In 1998, Schaab returned to Germany anyway, to be with his dying mother and surrender to authorities, apparently assured his cooperation would win him leniency. The light sentence he received raised questions, however, among nonproliferation specialists. American physicist David Albright, who was on the U.N. inspection team, suggested that the German government wanted to minimize public perception of Schaab's crime. "I think they wanted the Schaab story to disappear. It was intensely embarrassing," Albright says in "Stealing the Fire." The film suggests some people wanted Schaab himself to disappear. His lawyers tell the filmmakers that Brazilian authorities had warned them that foreign secret services wanted to kill or kidnap their client, and suggest that the closely timed deaths of associates Stemmler and Busse in the early 1990s may not have been natural, as reported. "Stealing the Fire" leaves such questions unexplored. But it firmly establishes that German companies, more broadly, supplied technology usable in Baghdad's plans. One high-ranking defector from Iraq's nuclear program says Germany was an "open field" for Iraqi ambitions in the 1980s, particularly for purchases from such companies as chemical giant Degussa and its subsidiary Leybold. A top Degussa executive retorts that "by the German laws, there were no illegal deliveries" during this pre-Gulf War period. German export controls, widely regarded as too lax, were toughened after the Gulf War. German industry was not alone, however, in helping develop Iraqi capabilities. In 1985-90, the U.S. Commerce Department, for example, licensed $1.5 billion in sales to Iraq of American technology with potential military uses. Schaab "of course did it for the money," says his lawyer Michael Rietz. But the centrifuge expert - described by wife Brigitta as "very quiet, very well-behaved; he doesn't smoke, he doesn't drink" - insists he was focused as much on the technological challenge, and not on illegality and international repercussions. "I stumbled naively into this thing," he says. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n20/domb01_.html * IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A NET ASSESSMENT by Norman Dombey London Review of Books, 16th October [.....] Khidhir Hamza is a Shia from Diwaniyah in southern Iraq. In the 1960s he studied physics at MIT and Florida State. He helped develop the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1970s, working in the reactor programme, and moved to the weapons programme proper in 1980, ending up as a general in the Special Security Forces involved in the warhead project. Unlike many of his senior physicist colleagues he avoided imprisonment, and unlike many of his senior Security Force and Baath Party colleagues he avoided execution. He managed to transfer from the weapons programme to al-Mansour University in Baghdad just before the Gulf War, and in 1994 slipped away to a small university in Libya. He even managed, with insider information, to make a lot of money on the Baghdad stock exchange. In 1995, after several spurned attempts, he persuaded the CIA to take him in, and to arrange for his family to be transported to the United States. Hamza's ghost-writer is Jeff Stein, who, according to Google, contributes to intelligence stories for a range of print and Internet media. Usually, it isn't clear in the book what is Hamza's and what is Stein's. But sometimes it is: 'The Jewish state and Iraq had been in a virtual state of war since 1948, when Palestine was dissected to make room for Jewish settlers' is clearly Hamza, while 'The PLO was a collection of terrorist groups, no matter how it presented itself' is surely Stein. Hamza's account is vivid, but contains several errors. He says that Germany had begun developing a nuclear weapon in the 1940s and that 'their work was picked up by the United States.' But the Manhattan Project grew out of a memorandum that Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls at the University of Birmingham sent to the British Government in March 1940. They pointed out the fundamental principle of a nuclear weapon (and the reason it is still so difficult to make one): the necessity to separate the isotope uranium-235 from natural uranium, which consists of uranium-238 and uranium-235 in a ratio of 142 to 1. You need about 25 kilogrammes of U-235 to make a weapon. Hamza is confused about uranium enrichment (the increase in the proportion of U-235 relative to U-238). There are two normal methods: gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge. Iraq considered both after Israel bombed its Osirak reactor in 1981, putting an end to any hope of using plutonium. Hamza writes: 'The centrifuge process involved extracting bomb-grade fuel by spinning a uranium compound-gas inside a fast rotating cylinder. The lighter uranium at the centre of the cylinder is enriched by the fuel.' This isn't right: in fact the lighter uranium is the enriched fuel, although a cascade of several hundred centrifuges is needed to increase the proportion of U-235 to anywhere near the 90 per cent enrichment necessary for weapons. During a visit to the US in 1975, Hamza tells us, he looked at a nuclear accelerator which 'was our guideway to accelerating atoms, and thus uranium enrichment'. Yet neither the diffusion nor the centrifuge method uses accelerators, because the gas involved in both processes is electrically neutral. The electromagnetic method of isotope separation (EMIS) does involve ions (charged atoms), and an accelerator might therefore be useful, but no one had thought about using EMIS in 1975. Then, at a meeting with Saddam's son-in-law Kamel in 1987, Hamza, as he puts it now, 'launched into . . . all the problems with uranium enrichment, from the French reactor to Jaffar's diddling with magnets'. But the French Osirak reactor project had nothing to do with uranium enrichment: the Iraqis had hoped to use Osirak to make plutonium, the alternative route to a bomb. As for Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, he really was 'Saddam's bombmaker': he had a PhD in experimental nuclear physics from Birmingham and was the senior physicist responsible for the programme. His 'diddling with magnets' was EMIS, which would have delivered the goods for Saddam by now had he restrained himself over Kuwait. So what was Hamza's role in the project? He was clearly not as senior as he makes out. In the book he frequently describes important meetings at second hand. Jaffar was not his only scientific superior: he answered to Humam al-Ghafour, Hussein al-Shahristani and Khalid Ibrahim Saeed, too. Besides, how likely is it that Saddam would have allowed his senior physicist to move to Libya without exacting retribution on his family, who remained in Baghdad? Hamza says he told a PLO representative, while he was still a PhD student, 'I don't know how to make a bomb,' then adds: 'I did, theoretically, of course.' But did he? Nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons (at least those of the atomic rather than thermonuclear kind) are based on nuclear fission (a very large nucleus, typically uranium or plutonium, splits into lighter nuclei with an accompanying energy release). When he testified recently to a Senate Committee, Hamza was described as a nuclear engineer: a professional who works with nuclear reactors. But Hamza has no specific training in nuclear fission for either reactors or weapons. His PhD wasn't concerned with the fission of a large nucleus but with the scattering of small nuclei or, to be precise, on how to calculate three-body forces - a very abstract topic. Solving the problem required a large amount of computation ($40,000 worth back in the late 1960s) on an old-fashioned mainframe. He went on from Florida State to Fort Valley State College in Georgia to establish a computer centre there. On his return to Iraq he became involved with the purchase of the Osirak reactor from France, but was also appointed to head a committee to buy, and then run, an IBM360 for the Nuclear Research Centre. Hamza's CV, which is on the Web, reveals him to be a specialist in scientific computation and modelling. He ran calculations for the gas diffusion enrichment project from 1980, for the dense plasma focus project from 1988 and, though he doesn't say so explicitly, presumably for simulations of the yield from the nuclear warhead that Iraq hoped to have once it acquired sufficient HEU. He was, in other words, a glorified computer scientist. Between 1987 and 1990, he also wrote reports on his colleagues' work and progress. He was, in his own words, 'Saddam's chief snitch'. And he doesn't seem to have had a high opinion of his colleagues: Jaffar is always wasting money or 'diddling', while Saeed is 'short' and 'chubby'. In his testimony to the Senate Committee on 31 July Hamza said that, according to German intelligence, 'with more than ten tons of uranium and one ton of slightly enriched uranium . . . in its possession, Iraq has enough to generate the needed bomb-grade uranium for three nuclear weapons by 2005.' That is correct, but of no significance. It is well known that Iraq, quite legally, has 11 tons of uranium in its possession (it actually has substantially more listed on the IAEA website, and until 1998 it was safeguarded by regular inspections). Using the ratio of about 140 to 1 of U-238 to U-235 in natural or slightly enriched uranium, and taking 25 kg as the amount of HEU needed for a bomb, it's easy to work out that 3.5 tons (140 x 25 kg) is the amount of natural uranium needed for a bomb. So 11 tons is the amount needed to build three bombs. It is not possible, however, to construct weapons directly out of uranium or slightly enriched uranium. Hamza managed to fool some people into confusing slightly-enriched uranium with HEU. The Bishop of Oxford, for example, wrote in the Observer (4 August) that 'the US Congress was told recently that Saddam Hussein has enough weapons-grade uranium for three nuclear bombs by 2005.' In his interview with the Times in September, Hamza claimed that the three nuclear bombs could be made within the next few months. This 'new estimation . . . is centred on the number of pirated centrifuges that Baghdad has been able to produce and the rapidity with which the reprocessing programme is being undertaken'. I don't know what reprocessing has to do with it - reprocessing is used in the production of plutonium, not HEU - but how does he know about the pirated centrifuges? In the Sunday Mirror he even claimed that 'Saddam now probably has hundreds of small centrifuges hidden around Iraq.' Why didn't he mention the pirated centrifuges to the Senate Committee? He hasn't been in Iraq for eight years, so this information can't be first-hand. Nor was he involved with the centrifuge programme, which only gets a few mentions in his book. According to Frank von Hippel, professor of public and international affairs at Princeton and a former assistant director for national security in the White House, 'Iraq had difficulty producing reliable [centrifuge] machines' and 'no [centrifuge] production facility had been established by the time the effort was halted by the bombings.' Iraq would have had to have solved many technical problems at a time of strict sanctions in order to set up a centrifuge facility since the IAEA inspectors left in 1998. Furthermore, a thousand working centrifuges would be required to produce enough HEU in one year. Nor could they function if they were 'hidden around Iraq': they have to be connected in a cascade. The reason Hamza's opinion changed so markedly between 31 July and 16 September is revealed in the Times interview. The International Institute for Strategic Studies dossier was published on 9 September, and was, in the view of Hamza's new masters in the United States, unhelpful. Hamza was required to add some urgency to the debate. There are two enlightening details in the book. First, Hamza claims that the Observer journalist Farzad Bazoft was executed by Saddam in March 1990 because he took earth samples to test for the presence of biological or chemical warfare agents. Unfortunately for Bazoft, his sample site was close to al-Atheer, the warhead facility, and the samples would have shown that experiments on nuclear warheads were being carried out in the vicinity. Second, he describes the problems caused for him and his family in Baghdad by a bogus story in the Sunday Times on 2 April 1995 announcing that he had been kidnapped in Greece and probably assassinated. He was actually in Libya at the time. The story reported that Hamza had confirmed a secret Iraqi weapon programme, and referred to documents confirming this. Until then the authorities in Baghdad hadn't been concerned about his absence from Iraq, but this changed everything. He eventually discovered that the CIA had planted the story and documents in order to smoke him out. It worked: Hamza managed to get to Hungary and the US Embassy in Budapest. With some difficulty he persuaded the CIA to take him and his family to the US. They were reluctant to play ball until Hamza told the CIA man that 'a British visa would be ready for me in a week . . . suddenly the roadblocks melted. The next morning an embassy car whisked me to the airport.' A week later, Madeline Albright quoted the CIA-forged documents at the UN Security Council in order to prevent any relaxation of the regime of sanctions on Iraq. [.....] The dossier also says that 'Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.' So what? The IAEA has told me that Iraq already has hundreds of tons of uranium at its disposal. Without enrichment facilities this material is useless for nuclear weapons, although it could conceivably be used in conventional weapons in the same way that depleted uranium is used by the UK and US. It is also possible that this African story is an intelligence sting: remember the capacitors destined for Iraq found at Heathrow in 1990 that turned out to have been planted by the FBI. [.....] Charles Duelfer told the Senate Committee that even before hostilities began in 1991, Saddam had ordered missiles and bombs to be armed with biological and chemical agents, and pre-authorised their use in the event of a US move on Baghdad. Duelfer says the Iraqi leadership believes that this is the reason the US agreed to a ceasefire. US power may win the day, as it did in Afghanistan, but victory may come at a high price. [.....] http://www.nationalpost.com/commentary/story.html?id={824DC0F5-EB6A-47CA 8928-3E967B994D16} * NORTH KOREA HAS WHAT IRAQ DREAMS OF by Andrew Coyne National Post, 18th October Eight years ago this week, the Clinton administration brought home a piece of paper from North Korea promising peace in our time. In exchange for diplomatic recognition, 500,000 tons a year of heavy fuel oil, and a pair of nuclear reactors, the Stalinist regime of Kim Jong Il (the diminutive "Great Leader," not to be confused with his father, Kim Il Sung, the "Glorious Leader") agreed to dismantle its burgeoning nuclear weapons program, and to allow international inspectors full access to its stockpiles of plutonium, to verify that these were not being used to manufacture a bomb. The so-called Agreed Framework, brokered with the help of Jimmy Carter, the former president and winner of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize, was hailed by The New York Times as "a resounding triumph." Defying "impatient hawks and other skeptics who accused the Clinton administration of gullibility" and warned that North Korea "was simply stalling while it built more bombs," negotiators had instead taken the path of peace. "If the North fulfills its commitments," the Times rhapsodized, "this negotiation could become a textbook case on how to curb the spread of nuclear arms." If the North fulfills its commitments. In fact, the North did not fulfill a single one. It used the plutonium, according to CIA reports, to make not one but two bombs. It has never allowed the sort of intrusive inspections promised. And, as it has just acknowledged, it has all the while been engaged in a clandestine program to develop more nuclear weapons, this time using enriched uranium. Turns out those impatient hawks were right: It was simply stalling while it built more bombs. To its existing arsenals of chemical and biological weapons, to say nothing of its enormous stockpiles of conventional arms, it may soon be able to add several nuclear warheads, if it has not already. These may be used either to terrorize its neighbours or to accessorize the long-range missiles that are one of its few exports. Or they may simply be put to the same use as before: as a means of extracting more concessions from the West, in return for still more promises from the North Koreans. The agreement, in short, has proved as good as North Korea's word. What began as a craven exercise in appeasement -- there is no overstatement in that word here -- has ended as these things usually do: with disillusionment on one side, an undiminished threat on the other, and another round of blackmail in the offing. I mention all this for the benefit of those who still wonder what all the fuss over Iraq is about. Even now, predictable voices are asking why, if the United States is so determined to disarm Iraq that it is willing to go to war, it does not do the same to North Korea. Indeed, the Bush administration's reaction to the North's astounding confession of bad faith was remarkably muted, limited to some faint murmurings about "dialogue" and "peace-loving nations." There is a very simple explanation for this. Listen closely: It's because North Korea already has the bomb. If we attacked, or even threatened to, they might level Seoul. It is precisely to avoid this predicament that the Americans have been pressing to take out Saddam Hussein: now, before he has the bomb. If we wait until he gets one -- I hear North Korea's terms are quite reasonable -- it will be impossible to take it away from him. Critics who accuse the United States of inconsistency have some nerve: These same people have been warning us that the Americans and their cowboy President were fixin' to invade every country that so much as looked at them sideways. But let them show a little discretion and suddenly they're hypocrites. In fact the situations are quite different, and call for different responses -- not only because Lil' Kim has the bomb that Saddam's dreams are made of, and not only because war in the Korean peninsula is of a different order of magnitude, in terms of carnage and destabilization, than an invasion of Iraq, but because there is more fluidity in the North Korean situation than is conceivable in Iraq. Crazy the regime may be, but it has of late been making some fitful attempts to come to grips with the reality of the outside world. In the present case it may have no higher aim in mind than to reprise the shakedown of 1994, but after the regime is relieved of that delusion, the revised terms of trade can be impressed upon it: If it does not give up its nuclear ambitions, pronto, it will lose all the gains it has made to date, together with any hope of future progress, whether in normalizing relations or inward investment or aid for its suffering people. The same applies to Iran, the third wheel on the "axis of evil." There is every case for waiting out the mullahs, for reasons that preclude the same approach to Saddam: The regime may fall of its own accord, it has no recent history of invading its neighbours, and it appears to be guided by at least some rational assessment of its own best interests. I was going to say it had no nukes, either, but apparently all it takes is a half-million tons of fuel oil and a letter of introduction from Jimmy Carter. http://www.sltrib.com/10182002/nation_w/8233.htm * U.S. APPROACHES TO N. KOREA AND IRAQ ARE VASTLY DIFFERENT by Steven R. Weisman Salt Lake Tribune, from The New York Times, 18th October WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration responded Thursday to the disclosure of North Korea's nuclear weapons program with a strategy of urgent diplomatic pressure free of military threats or even a tone of crisis. It was a marked contrast with the drumbeat of warnings about force and mobilization of troops and equipment against Iraq, also a member of the "axis of evil" identified by President Bush, but one he says poses the most serious danger to the United States. The two separate and, in some respects, contradictory strategies reflected the administration's desire not to let North Korea derail Washington's plans to confront Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. The risk was that some Americans might wonder why conciliation ought not to be tried with both countries. Aides to Bush were quick to assert that the two situations are entirely different. "There is not one policy that fits all," said Richard Boucher, the State Department spokesman. "Each situation has to be dealt with on its own." Administration officials say that although Iraq probably does not yet have nuclear weapons, it poses a more serious threat to its region because of its record of already using chemical weapons against its enemies and of invading two neighboring countries. Whereas North Korea is described by many experts as wanting its weapons as a defensive measure, to deter an invasion of its territory by others, Iraq is feared generally as a nation willing to use its weapons to bully others. This concern is what the administration says justifies its policy of pre-emptive action against Baghdad. "North Korea is a fundamentally conservative dictatorship," said a former diplomat who has dealt with problems on the Korean peninsula over three decades. "They're the worst kind of totalitarian regime, and their willingness to cheat is unquestioned. But they do not pose an imminent threat to regional stability. The fundamental threat from North Korea is still deterred by the presence of American troops in South Korea. So the administration is right to focus on Iraq." A State Department official said Iraq was different from North Korea not simply because it has used so-called "weapons of mass destruction" and has ties with terrorists but because it has proven itself to be "at least sometimes susceptible to international pressure." As a result, he said, diplomacy was justified, at least for now. The administration's low key strategy toward North Korea was being carried out by the four partners with which it has been working for years to coax North Korea into living peacefully with its neighbors. The clear hope at the White House was that Japan, South Korea, China and Russia could salvage the possibility of negotiation to remove an advanced nuclear threat from a nation as isolated, dictatorial and unpredictable as any on earth. For Iraq, by contrast, the administration was continuing to threaten the use of force as a way of bludgeoning Saddam's regime to accept inspections, followed by disarmament, of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. Perhaps inevitably, many in Washington and in policy circles were focusing Thursday on why the approach of engagement toward North Korea -- which included the implication that economic aid could resume some day -- might not also be valid for Baghdad. "The American reaction shows you the difference between dealing with a country that already may have nuclear weapons and one that doesn't," said Gary Milhollin, who is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms and is also a leading expert on nuclear proliferation issues. The North Koreans were believed as early as 1993 to have one or two nuclear bombs from their plutonium program, and the latest revelations about their parallel program in developing highly enriched uranium means they could have more. This means, according to Milhollin, that North Korea could have the capacity to attack Tokyo, Seoul or even the United States right now, which necessitates a cautious approach in dealing with the secretive government in Pyongyang. North Korea's artillery, rockets and other conventional weapons -- which experts say could easily destroy large parts of Seoul -- have for decades served as a deterrent against any possibility of an attack initiated by the United States. Military experts say that, for all its erratic conduct, North Korea has armed itself to deter attacks rather than blackmail or coerce neighboring countries. In some ways, the purpose of North Korea's nuclear program is viewed by diplomatic experts as analogous to that of Pakistan's. Just as North Korea has acquired nuclear arms to protect itself from being overrun by South Korea, Pakistan has moved to acquire such weapons to counter the threat presented by it much larger neighbor, India. If there was disagreement over how to handle North Korea in the Bush administration, which was divided early last year, it wasn't evident on Thursday. That could have been because the so-called hawks and doubters who have criticized past conciliatory moves toward North Korea are now preoccupied with mounting a military action against Iraq. For North Korea, the negotiating approach is back in fashion for now, and an administration filled with officials critical of the 1994 Clinton-era accord under which the North promised to give up its nuclear weapons program is working to see if the agreement can be revived and made foolproof. MIDDLE EAST/ARAB WORLD http://www.nationalpost.com/world/story.html?id={2DEA6D1A-BE9E-4F7E-A5B8 34CAE954FB41} * A GRIM REMINDER OF IRAQ'S TAWDRY EVIL by Matthew Fisher National Post, Canada, 12th October AL MUTLA RIDGE, Kuwait - There are no visible traces of war to be seen now in the shifting sands of this windblown hill about one third of the way from Kuwait City to Iraq. But it was here in 1991 that the naked thievery and wretched incompetence of Saddam Hussein's army and the overwhelming might of the U.S.-led coalition were starkly revealed. Many hundreds of Iraqis who died at Al Mutla were buried beneath what is now a border police parking lot at the top of the ridge. They had been caught out in the open as the sun came up. Waiting for them on the far side of the rise was a gang of U.S. M-1A Abrams tanks. Thundering overhead were squadrons of U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy attack aircraft. For those trapped on the ridge, there was no escape and no means of defence. When I reached Mutla on the morning after the massacre, the tanks and fire trucks, buses and cars and stolen Rolls Royces taken by the fleeing Iraqis were no more than twisted, smoking hulks. Mangled and charred bodies lay everywhere on the margins of the road. Those who managed to escape the vehicles had been cut down by shrapnel or bullets from warplanes, or caught in minefields that had been planted by the Iraqis themselves. Among the ruins was a dazzling, sometimes tawdry variety of plunder. The Iraqis had hoped to return home with everything from mink stoles to diapers, refrigerators and potatoes. Images of the slaughter transmitted to the world were so horrific, they quickly became a factor in the first president George Bush's decision to call the ground war off after only 100 hours. But they also served as an apt epitaph for Iraq's brutal, ultimately futile seven-month occupation of what Saddam Hussein called Iraq's 19th province and a useful reminder of how weak, undisciplined and rapacious the Iraqi army was and undoubtedly still is. George W. Bush is now making the case for war with Iraq if it does not surrender its weapons of mass destruction and destroy its ability to make more of the same. He calls Iraq and its dictator "a grave and growing danger." What has often been forgotten by those in the United Sates and elsewhere who have objected to the campaign against Iraq is how outrageously the Iraqi army behaved during its seven-month occupation of Kuwait. A far more extreme example of Iraqi perfidy and stupidity occurred the day before the lopsided battle at Al Mutla. On Saddam's direct orders, 782 Kuwait oil wells had been set alight in a matter of hours. By the time the last of these wildfires was tamed 10 months later, the black smoke they spewed had caused fantastic environmental damage throughout the Middle East and burned away billions of dollars of oil. There is still no accurate account of how many people in Kuwait were arrested, tortured or murdered during the Iraqi occupation or of exactly how many of those who were kidnapped from Kuwait are still alive in Iraqi jails. The number of victims of Iraqi violence was in the thousands. The number of those whose property was stolen was in the many hundreds of thousands. There were many summary trials and public executions for alleged acts of treason and insurrection. Often there was no trial at all. What has been recorded in an Atlas of Iraqi War Crimes published by the government of Kuwait is that Iraqi forces burned 540 Kuwait homes and 600 businesses, shops, hospitals, schools and hotels. Every one of the country's water and power plants and television stations was looted or destroyed. The international airport was razed and a dozen aircraft were incinerated, including a British Airways jumbo jet. Dozens of unmarked minefields were left behind when the Iraqis ran away. So were scores of anti-aircraft artillery. In a foretaste of what may happen if the United States attacks Iraq this winter, most of these guns were purposely placed in urban areas so the only way to eliminate them was to bomb populated areas. Iraq had also been busy changing scores of prominent Kuwaiti place names. The community of Sabbiya became Saddamiat Al Metlaa. The port of Abdullah became the port of Saddam. About 42 major monuments to Saddam Hussein were erected during the occupation and hundreds of portraits of the Iraqi leader filled public spaces. A few depicted Saddam in a general's regalia. Others showed him as a holy warrior, a businessman, a humble Bedouin or a wise legislator. Many cast the Iraqi dictator as a benevolent father figure bestowing gifts upon children or the infirm. The ludicrous billboards of Saddam, which were quickly riddled with bullets after coalition troops arrived, are still laughable. But the graphic horrors of Al Mutla and the poisonous plumes of smoke that turned day into night over the Burghan, Ahmadi and Magwa oil fields and much of the Persian Gulf are still haunting. What happened to all those swaggering Iraqis who suddenly left their pathetic possessions - mostly dirty blankets, half-eaten rations and injection kits to ward off the effects of chemical warfare -- behind in the warren of bunkers and foxholes that were everywhere around and near Kuwait City and bolted, pell-mell, for home? Iraqi survivors of the occupation of Kuwait know what vile deeds were committed in Saddam's name. These soldiers must ponder whether the massacre in the sands at Al Mutla Ridge was a harbinger of what lies ahead for them and their country unless, as the Bush White House has suggested, they do something to rid themselves of the preening bully whose oversized portraits infest so many public places in Iraq. http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=65541 * BAHRAIN CALLS FOR ARAB SUMMIT TO DISCUSS IRAQ CRISIS Gulf News, 14th October Bahraini Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa yesterday called for an immediate Arab summit to discuss the Iraq crisis, and dismissed all suggestions of an Iraqi threat by chemical or biological weapons as "mere exaggerations," the local media reported yesterday. Speaking at his weekly majlis, attended by members of the ruling family and senior officials, Sheikh Khalifa said the possible U.S. military intervention in Iraq, which he described as "unacceptable", would destroy Iraq's infrastructure and threaten its national interests. "The continuous threats (by the U.S.) to wage war in this vital region was not intended to enforce the return of the UN weapons inspectors to Iraq but to dominate this Arab country," he said, urging all GCC and Arab countries to come forward to stop any further deterioration. "We all have to speak up against this war. It is unfortunate that we just continue to sit and watch a brethren Arab country being destroyed." Warning of "war-mania" that would affect the economics of the region, Sheikh Khalifa stressed that there was no proof that Iraq has biological weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. He said the Iraqi danger was being over exaggerated. The same thing happened in 1991 so that gas masks could be dumped on GCC countries, he said. http://www.dawn.com/2002/10/14/int2.htm * UN'S IRAQ DECISION NOT BINDING, SAYS PRINCE by Syed Rashid Husain Dawn, 14th October RIYADH, Oct 13: Prince Sultan, the Saudi second deputy premier and minister of defence and aviation, was reported here as saying that any UN Security Council decision on Iraq will not be binding on the Kingdom. This is in sharp contrast to what was said by the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal earlier that Saudi Arabia would be obliged to abide by any UN resolutions on Iraq. He had hinted earlier that in case of any military assault on Iraq under the UN umbrella, Saudi Arabia would be obliged to offer its territory. However, now the Saudi position seems to have changed. "We don't have the ability to oppose the resolution of the United Nations or the Security Council. But it is not obligatory on us to implement what is said. We give priority to the interests of our country, then of the Muslims and the Arabs," Prince Sultan was reported as telling the press in Dubai, after visiting the MBC television there. In the meantime, the build-up to any possible military assault on Iraq is continuing unabated. The US has reportedly ordered the deployment of several hundred army military planners to Kuwait from where troops could enter Iraq. The US Central Command, based in Florida has already announced that a forward post would be established in Qatar by November this year. The US already has a large command headquarters in Bahrain. The US has reportedly beefed up its forces in Gulf, in anticipation of a possible assault on Iraq. In the meantime, it was also reported here that the US Navy is seeking two big merchant ships to carry more armour and tracked vehicles from the US and Europe to the Middle East. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/articleshow?artid=25208393 * SAUDI ARABIA WON'T TAKE PART IN IRAQ ATTACK: SAUDI FM Times of India (from AFP), 15th October TIARET, Algeria: Saudi Arabia will not take part in a possible military intervention in Iraq, whether it is launched solely by the United States or has the backing of the United Nations, the country's Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal said on Monday. Speaking on the second day of talks in Algeria on problems facing the Middle East, Prince Saud said that even official support from the UN Security Council would not change the kingdom's decision not to participate in an attack. Approval by the UN executive council would "oblige all signatories of the (UN) charter to help the Security Council in its mission," he said, adding: "But there is no doubt -- on no country can it impose participation in a possible operation." The priority for Saudi Arabia, Washington's main ally in the Gulf, was now "to protect Iraq against possible strikes", the diplomatic chief said. In remarks published Monday, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz echoed Prince Saud's comments, saying: "The kingdom has a special status in the Arab and Muslim worlds as it is home to the two holy mosques (in Mecca and Medina) and will not sacrifice this status for the sake of anyone." Prince Saud said he had discussed Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika during his stay. http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=65587 * SYRIA EXPECTS U.S. TO LAUNCH ATTACK ON IRAQ by Nadim Kawach Gulf News, Abu Dhabi, 14th October Syria said yesterday it expected the United States to attack Iraq and urged Arab states to unite against a possible U.S. occupation of that country and threats to the region. Suleiman Haddad, Syria's Assistant Foreign Minister, also paid tributes to President His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan for his strong support for Arab causes and efforts to prevent a military offensive against Iraq. "America will strike Iraq whether or not it allows back the UN arms inspectors," Haddad said in a lecture at the Zayed Centre for Coordination and Follow up in Abu Dhabi. "Syria is opposed to this strike because Iraq is a sisterly country and there are no justifications for such an attack. Unfortunately, the United States, backed by Israel, has aborted all peaceful efforts because they want to crush any Arab country which possesses large resources and elements of power." Haddad, whose country shares an 80-km border with Iraq, said Syria was exerting efforts to prevent an attack on Iraq by persuading it to allow back the inspectors. It has also been in touch with the European Union, the United Nations and other organisations. "Any harm to Iraq will affect Syria. We have made arrangements to help our Iraqi brothers in case of an attack. I don't think there is anything that can stop a U.S. aggression on Iraq except total Arab unity and solidarity." Haddad warned that the occupation of Iraq could lead to its fragmentation and this could trigger a sectarian war. "But America should realise that Iraq is not Afghanistan and the majority of the public opinion, including in the U.S., are opposed to a strike," he said. He stressed that Syria is against terrorism in all its forms and believes that the "real terrorism is what Israel is doing to the Palestinian children and women." "Syria was among the first countries that called during the 1980s for an international conference to distinguish between terrorism and the right of people to resist occupation of their land and regain their rights," he said. "Syria believes in peace as a strategic option that is based on justice and UN resolutions calling for Israel to withdraw from the Arab lands it occupied in 1967. This is a goal which we will never give up. "It should be attained through peace, otherwise there are other alternatives. We believe that the world will not back Israel forever and Europe and other countries are now closer to our just cause." http://cgi.wn.com/?action=display&article=16207922&template=baghdad/indexsea rch.txt&index=recent * WAR GAMES HELD IN SOUTHERN JORDAN The Associated Press,14th October AMMAN, Jordan (AP) ‹ Troops from the United States, Britain and Arab countries took part in war games in southern Jordan on Monday, diplomats said, and the government stressed the exercise had nothing to do with preparations for a possible U.S. attack on Iraq. Jordan previously said the war games were due to start around mid-October and continue through early November. Monday, officials refused to answer repeated calls by The Associated Press seeking comment. A Jordan-based diplomatic source, insisting on anonymity, confirmed the desert maneuvers started Monday. Information Minister Mohammad Affash Adwan said recently the exercise involved armies from several Arab countries, including Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. A British Embassy source, also speaking on condition of anonymity, told The Associated Press that British forces were also taking part in the drills at an unspecified location in Jordan's southern desert. No other details were immediately available. Issues relating to the Jordanian military are usually not made public, but the added caution Monday indicated that the government was trying to keep a low profile on the war games to avoid sending a wrong signal to Iraq, its main trade partner. Adwan and other Cabinet officials have stressed over the last two weeks that the drills were routine and periodical and have nothing to do with developments in the region ‹ a reference to possible U.S. military action against Iraq. Jordan, like other Arab countries, opposes an attack on Iraq, saying it may destabilize the volatile Middle East. Jordan is a longtime U.S. ally, but also has close business ties with Iraq. Two-way trade with Baghdad reached $700 million last year. Jordan also receives all its oil needs from Iraq. http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=1140712002 * KEY US HEADQUARTERS MOVE TO KUWAIT by Tim Ripley The Scotsman, 15th October THE Pentagon is moving two key command teams to Kuwait in a move designed to increase its ability to launch a strike against Iraq at short notice. As well as sending the army¹s 5 Corps headquarters from Germany and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters from California to the emirate, the US has chartered two more civilian cargo ships to move tanks and other heavy equipment to the Gulf from the US and Europe. Attacks on US troops in Kuwait yesterday and last week highlighted the US build-up in the emirate, which is strategically placed on Iraq¹s southern border. For US military planners, the use of Kuwaiti military bases is considered a requirement for any campaign against Baghdad to effect a regime change. The low-key announcements clearly indicate that preparations for an attack on Iraq are gaining momentum and will involve several divisions of US troops. The two headquarters are each made up of between 600 and 1,000 staff officers and communications specialists. By deploying them ahead of any combat units, the US central command chief, General Tommy Franks, hopes to allow key planning and preparation to be completed in a low profile way, and in a manner that will not attract a pre-emptive strike by the Iraqis. Tens of thousands of combat troops will then be able to fly to the Gulf from their bases in the US and pick up tanks and vehicles from stockpiles. US planning envisages a brigade - about 5,000 men - completing this process within 36 hours of landing at a Gulf airfield. The US navy has also recently chartered a high-speed catamaran to speed the transfer of troops and equipment from stockpiles in Qatar up the Gulf to Kuwait. Some 14,000 US soldiers and marines are in Kuwait as part of the build-up of forces, although the Pentagon is trying to play down their presence. It is putting out the story that they are participating in "joint exercises" with Kuwait forces - only the Kuwaitis seem to be taking the time off. The arrival of the two headquarters in Kuwait later this month will coincide with the deployment of Gen Franks¹ central headquarters in Qatar. The US air force already has its Middle East command post up and running in Saudi Arabia, and alternative facilities are ready in Qatar if Riyadh should veto the use of its bases for an attack on Iraq. By deploying the two corps headquarters to Kuwait, the US will have the ability to launch multiple attacks simultaneously, for example launching a siege of Basra with marines while also striking at Baghdad with armoured forces. http://www.tehrantimes.com/Description.asp?Da=10/16/02&Cat=4&Num=007 * QATAR OPPOSES ANY U.S. WAR ON IRAQ, CONSIDERING BASES Tehran Times, 16th October KUWAIT - Qatar said on Tuesday it opposes any U.S.-led war against Iraq, but has yet to decide if it will grant Washington's request to use its bases for such an attack. Qatar's Foreign Minister set out his Persian Gulf state's stance as the United States seeks UN Security Council approval for tough new powers for arms inspectors find and destroy what Washington says are Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction. The United States has threatened military action against Iraq if it fails to comply with its demands and with UN resolutions, Reuters reported. "Our view in Qatar is against any military action in the area and we hope Iraq will accept (UN) Security Council resolutions and the entry of the arms inspectors," Qatar's Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani told reporters upon arriving in Kuwait for high-level talks. "Until now even America has not decided on military action. This issue is being discussed in America and the UN. "So it is premature for U.S. [sic! - PB. Presumably 'us'] to state our position now," the minister said when asked if Qatar would block the use of its military facilities by Washington in case of a war. "Nobody approached us until now" with a request to use Qatari bases in case of war, he added. Qatar is increasingly becoming a key base for U.S. military operations in the region, with Washington boosting the capabilities of military facilities there and moving command structure officers next month to the tiny, gas-rich state. By December, a $1.4 billion U.S. upgrade of Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar is due for completion with a state-of-the-art command and control room. Washington said this month it was negotiating with Qatar on the use of Al Udeid in case of war with Iraq. "There is a resolution now being drafted in the Security Council and we hope it will be fair for both Iraq and the UN and to be accepted by Iraq so the region can avoid military action," Sheikh Hamad said of a U.S.-British effort to have a new resolution on toughened rules for weapons inspectors passed by the world body. They have both warned Iraq, Kuwait's former occupier, of possible military action, but Baghdad denies it has nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. A clear dispute between Qatar and the dominant Persian Gulf Arab power, Saudi Arabia, is having some impact on war plans and the unity of Washington's main allies in the region, diplomats said. On the surface, Persian Gulf sources said, the dispute is over what Saudi Arabia sees as programs that insult its royal family on the popular Qatar-based Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel. But there are other differences over Qatar's general policies which the kingdom at times sees as negatively impacting its own approach over the Middle East crisis, dealing with the United States and other issues, the sources said. "I do not want to get into the details of this issue," Sheikh Hamad said when asked about the dispute. "The ties between U.S. and Saudi Arabia are important and strong and if there is a misunderstanding it will be resolved in calm fashion." After months of behind-the-scenes complaints by Saudi Arabia and a failed effort by Sheikh Hamad to go to the kingdom to tackle the dispute, Riyadh in September recalled its ambassador to Doha for consultations. Sheikh Hamad, who came here in July, said on Tuesday his latest visit was not to request Kuwait's mediation in the dispute but to offer Qatar's full support after a U.S. marine was killed and another wounded last week in a "terrorist" attack during war games on a Kuwaiti island. Persian Gulf sources told Reuters that Saudi Arabia, in what would be a major blow to Qatar, might boycott a December summit of the six-nation Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Qatar. "We hope all will attend," the minister said when asked about a possible Saudi boycott. http://www.iranmania.com/news/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=12571&NewsKin d=CurrentAffairs&ArchiveNews=Yes * IRAQ ACCUSES IRAN OF 53 CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IranMania.com, 17th October BAGHDAD, Oct 16 (AFP) - Iraq on Wednesday accused Iran of violating their ceasefire agreement 53 times in 75 days this year, in a message to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Baghdad charged in the message, delivered by Iraqi envoy to the United Nations Mohamed Al-Duri, that "Iran has violated 53 times the ceasefire between July 4 and August 20," according to the state INA news agency. Iraq and Iran have yet to sign a formal peace treaty 14 years after the end of their 1980-88 conflict, which cost about one million lives. They maintain relations at the charge d'affairs level. _______________________________________________ Sent via the discussion list of the Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. To unsubscribe, visit http://lists.casi.org.uk/mailman/listinfo/casi-discuss To contact the list manager, email casi-discuss-admin@lists.casi.org.uk All postings are archived on CASI's website: http://www.casi.org.uk